The Midsouth Political Science Review

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The Midsouth Political Science Review

Volume 24, 2025

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Participation in Formal and Informal Networks: The Case of the American Legislative Council and Arkansas State Legislators, 2011-2022

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Abstract

Scholars suggest that members of both "hybrid" and citizen legislatures often rely on lobbyists for policy information, especially in emerging policy areas. One such source of policy information is the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a prominent conservative-oriented organization known for drafting generic bills at gatherings, which legislative members from various states can then introduce in their own jurisdictions. Building upon this prior research, we employ an exponential random graph model (ERGM) using partisanship, geographical location, legislative chamber, overlapping tenures, and gender. The goal of this article is to determine who participates in these voluntary networking opportunities and who does not. Participation in ALEC events is not uniform, even among conservative legislators, though we do find that clustered participation by party among Arkansas legislators, with Democratic participation ending as the two parties became more polarized. More importantly, ALEC participation did foster more networking between colleagues from different regions of the state. We also find that the few women who participate play disproportionately larger roles as central actors in linking these conservative policy networks within ALEC together and focus on one female Arkansas legislator who serves as the bridge between fiscal and business regulation networks within ALEC affiliates.

Introduction

Recent studies have highlighted the value of social network theory in understanding political behavior (Heaney and McClurg, 2009; Carpenter,

Esterling, and Lazer, 2003). Our research builds upon this foundation by examining the network of Arkansas legislators, with a particular focus on multiplexity. We go beyond prior studies that solely focused on legislators' affiliation with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) to explore the broader range of connections that shape their interactions.[1] This study investigates how network structure, several types of homophily (similarity), and the presence of multiplex ties (overlapping relationships) influence collaboration patterns and sponsorship of legislation.

Multiplexity

Social network analysis has become a valuable tool for understanding the dynamics of power and influence within social structures (Verbrugge, 1979; Heaney and McClurg, 2009; Lazega and Pattison, 1999). More recent studies highlight the need for further research on the evolution of networks and the complex interplay of multiplex ties (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Shipilov, 2012). This study explores the concept of multiplexity within the network of Arkansas legislators. Multiplexity refers to situations where actors have overlapping ties, such as shared values, professional connections, and personal friendships (Verbrugge, 1979). We examine how these multiplex ties influence collaboration and decision-making among legislators. We hypothesize that multiplex ties can have both positive and negative consequences for legislators. On the one hand, multiplex ties can foster collaboration, trust, and information sharing. On the other hand, these ties may also create conflicting loyalties and hinder legislators' ability to make independent decisions.

Several factors may contribute to network multiplexity developing between members, including the environment in which they interact and social and economic benefits. For example, while workplace connections reflect an element of random selection, additional ties of friendship are often fostered between co-workers due to contact opportunities and preferences (e.g., environmental factors), resulting in greater collaboration, compassion, care, and harmony (Shipilov, 2012; Verbrugge, 1979; Liu et al, 2019; Voelker,

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[1] We selected ALEC for two reasons: First, it has influenced public policy in Arkansas by providing draft legislation in a number of areas such as occupational licensing and federalism (American Legislative Exchange Council 2024). As McQuide (2012) concludes, lobbyists are more likely to have influence in states with either "part-time" or hybrid legislatures than their professional counterparts. Second, Andreassona and Rajaha (2022) demonstrate that ALEC encourages legislators to reduce their own policymaking capacity resources so that they rely on ALEC resources, such as conferences, even more

McDowell, and Harris, 2013). Sociodemographic attributes like gender and race may affect the formation of friendship ties, especially within heterophilous structures (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris, 2009). Social and economic factors, facilitated by commoditized trust (Voelker, McDowell, and Harris, 2013) and shared meaning, are also drivers of multiplex network tie development (Ferriani, Font, and Corrado, 2013).

While multiplex ties offer potential benefits, they can also present challenges for network members, such as increased friction due to conflicting loyalties or competing motives (Basov and Brennecke, 2017; Shipilov, 2012). For instance, an Arkansas legislator might need to vote against a bill sponsored by a friend that is inconsistent with their political party's' platform. The quality and intensity of engagement within these ties can also influence their effectiveness (Verbrugge, 1979; Higgins, Crepalde, and Fernandes, 2021). While maintaining multiplex network ties often yield benefits, the effect can vary for members. Members may experience improved communication, advice-sharing, and collaborative connections resulting from the type and intensity of their engagement within a network (Liu et al., 2019; see also Lazega and Pattison, 1999). Granovetter (1973) suggests that when an actor's connections form a triangle (triad), trust can be assumed between them based on their existing connections (Liu et al., 2019; see also Basov and Brennecke, 2017). They may also experience greater stability due to new connections forming and existing ties strengthening, especially while ascending through their organization (Bliemel, McCarthy, and Maine, 2016). However, the quality and level of these ties are less predictable (Verbrugge, 1979; see Higgins, Crepalde, and Fernandes, 2021 for contrasting view); and additional ties could lead to increased friction within the network structure as members navigate conflicting motives (Shipilov, 2012).

This phenomenon is particularly true for politicians who must negotiate their political ambition and a desire to preserve their network connections. A legislator seeking to maintain the goodwill trust of friendship ties might make different political decisions than one concerned with sustaining competence trust (e.g., determining whether other individuals have the ability to performance necessary tasks) (see Nooteboom, 1996; as cited in Ferriani, Font, and Corrado, 2013). While the social benefits of networks are well-established, legislators influenced by economic incentives (e.g., a state salary, campaign financing, and district funding) may also be inclined to develop or sustain overlapping relationships. Our study examines two distinct networks and offers that, should their objectives

diverge, the Arkansas legislative members are required to manage the complexity and act decisively. This review of the literature highlights the potential for multiplex ties to influence collaboration, trust, and ultimately, political decision-making. Our study will explore these dynamics within the Arkansas legislature, analyzing how multiplex ties interact with factors like homophily and political incentives.

Network Structure

Tie Strength

        Beyond the general influence of tie quality, multiplex ties hold particular significance for network members' outcomes. Actors with strong ties are likely to occupy more advantageous network positions (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2003). By leveraging these connections, they can maximize their time by reducing the effort needed to transmit and receive valuable information, often acquiring it faster than peripheral actors (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2003; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992; Hansen, 1991). (However, the types of information being dispersed can impact this advantage, as noted by Iribarren and Moro (2011)). This access to resources and information fuels innovation, making influential network members with strong multiplex ties more likely to experience career advancement (Ostoic, 2017).

        Multiplex ties, characterized by overlapping connections, can contribute to the enduring nature of networks (Carley, 1991). The strength of these ties within a network can be influenced by environmental factors like homophily and the length of connections (Martin and Yeung, 2006). Liu et al. (2019) argue that continued collaboration is significantly impacted by previous and anticipated interactions. While heterophilous ties (connections between dissimilar actors) may be fragile and short-lived (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001) or dissolve due to attrition (Louch, 2000, as cited in Martin and Yeung, 2006; see also Burt, 2000), we propose that Arkansas legislators typically maintain enduring ties within the network even after their terms have ended. The tie persistence likely stems from shared political ideology, ongoing professional interactions, or strong friendships that endure beyond political careers. As a result, the Arkansas legislature exhibits a high degree of network stability despite member turnover, with a structure characterized by few central nodes.

Positionality

Network multiplexity can significantly enhance an actor's ability to leverage network benefits, potentially offering both supportive and instrumental ties (Schaefer, 2011). These supportive ties facilitate the flow of resources within a dense network, while instrumental ties function as bridges between discrete groupings (Schaefer, 2011; see also Higgins, Crepalde, and Fernandes, 2021). Some network members with strong multiplex ties may be privy to information, companionship, and mentoring at a lower cost and with greater frequency compared to those with weaker connections (Schaefer, 2011). Information may eventually reach peripheral network members; however, those in central positions with strong multiplex ties are often first to be involved in the exchange and control the subsequent flow (Schaefer, 2011). For this study's purposes, influence is conceptualized by one's ability to achieve exchange benefits within the network (Simpson et al., 2011b). It is important to note that central actors with strong multiplex ties may not always possess both influence and frequent exchange benefits, as positional advantage can depend on the specific resource type being considered (Schaefer, 2011).

Some network ties, particularly those with overlapping connections, may be invisible to external observers. Humans generally take mental shortcuts, leading them to presume connections exist between network members where they might not (Freeman, 1992 as cited in Simpson et al., 2011a). Misconceptions about network structure and limitations can influence actors' behavior (Schaefer, 2011). Simpson et al.'s (2011) study on the level of network perception for both central and peripheral actors proposed that peripheral actors' view of the network structure may be more accurate (for previous findings, see Simpson and Borch, 2005; Casciaro, 1998; Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1990). This advanced knowledge possessed by peripheral members includes an awareness of how change occurs within the network and who wields influence (Simpson et al., 2011b). Due to their heterophilous connections (connections to dissimilar actors) and advanced knowledge of the structure, peripheral members may also be likely to achieve their career aspirations (Granovetter, 1982; Beggs and Hurlbert, 1997). Conversely, central network members overestimate the collective influence of other prominent members; and, their misconceptions about the network could lead peripheral members to a social trap of prioritizing short-term gains at the expense of long-term advancement (Simpson et al., 2011a). This lack of awareness about the full network structure can have unintended consequences. While increased discernment may help individual outlying members and allow them to strategically engage in more high value

exchanges, rank competition within the network will likely hinder any long-term collective advancement (Simpson et al., 2011b).

Homophily and Heterophily

Homophily (the tendency to connect with similar others) can be a significant factor in the formation of multiplex ties, where connections span multiple domains. Previous studies have noted homophily determines with whom we discuss matters of importance, the friends we select, and mentorship and allyship in the workplace (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Marsden 1987, 1988; Verbrugge, 1977, 1983; Ibarra 1992, 1995). Homophilous engagement, or relationships between those with similar traits, occurs more frequently than heterophilous ties (connections between dissimilar actors) (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Burt, 2000). These homophilous connections often lead to new relationships that mirror an actor's existing social circles because they offer familiarity, trust, and emotional connection (Voelker, McDowell, and Harris, 2013). Those network members finding themselves in the minority may be more apt to pursue heterophilous relationships (Heaney and McClurg, 2009). Because homophily reflects the distance information must flow between two nodes in network structures, it often results in the localization of culture, behavior, and important news (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Limiting engagement to those with a shared belief system can reinforce an actor's biases, and multiplex ties that reinforce these homophilous connections can amplify this effect (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Fischer, 1982).

Moving beyond general discussions of homophily, scholars are increasingly recognizing its nuances and proposing typologies to categorize these variations, particularly how they affect the formation and influence of multiplex ties. For example, McPherson et al.'s (2001) study distinguishes between *baseline homophily*, or connections created from initial similarities and attraction, and *inbreeding homophily*, those similarities that are reinforced following sustained engagement (see also Voelker, McDowell, and Harris, 2013). They also leverage Lazarsfeld and Merton's (1954) concepts of *status homophily*, reflecting acquired or constructed traits, and *value homophily*, reflecting the motivations, perspectives, and convictions that drive behavior to further explore homophilous relationships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Let us delve deeper into *status homophily* and *value homophily*.

Status Homophily

      Status homophily can hinder the development of collaborative relationships within networks, particularly by limiting the potential of multiplex ties to bridge divides between network segments. Central actors in heterophilous relationships may be less likely to serve as a connection point between the segments (Louch, 2000). Low-status actors seeking expertise from high-status actors may struggle to establish a connection that progresses beyond a single communication instance (Liu et al., 2019). In a study on nonprofits, Galaskiewicz (1985) also found that leaders and line workers in uncertain environments were more likely to value network members with higher stature and greater experience than their homophilous professional affiliations. Trust acts as a mechanism for actors to strategically share information, with perceived trustworthiness of others guiding these decisions (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2003). Network members have the propensity to affiliate and form ties within the same education, income, and other social classes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Kalmijn 1998, Hout 1982, Hauser 1982; Marsden, 1987; Verbrugge, 1977; Louch, 2000; Yamaguchi, 1990). This selectivity and social class homophily further reinforce trust-building and influence within network structures, as actors are more likely to trust and be influenced by those they perceive share their status and values (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001).

      While *status homophily* can limit collaboration, scholars suggest that factors like gender and proximity can moderate these effects by influencing the formation and strength of multiplex ties. Studies have indicated that males who are college educated tend to have more heterophilous networks compared to other actors, who often select confidants with similar educational backgrounds (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Marsden, 1987; Campbell et al., 1986; Campbell, 1988; Fischer, 1982). Fischer and Oliker (1983) found gender behavior linked to both personality and lived experiences (dispositional factors) and network position (structural factors), affecting the number of friendship ties each maintained during different life stages. Except for workplace settings and men's political networks, which tend to exhibit gender homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001), adult social networks and workplace ties are typically heterophilous. This suggests that context and network structure play a significant role in shaping homophily patterns. Rates of baseline gender homophily in the workplace is particularly pronounced for men in leadership roles, indicating a propensity to align with other men for mentorship and friendship (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). However, how gender and proximity specifically influence the formation of

multiplex ties, and how these ties in turn moderate collaboration within networks, requires further investigation.

Network density and geographic proximity can influence the formation of multiplex ties by shaping both homophily and the likelihood of cross-group interactions. Network members in "density dependent" environments (Heaney and McClurg, 2009) may be more likely to develop heterophilous ties and friendships if the groups' composition or structure supports it. Because it is so often homogeneous, geographic homophily could also serve as a proxy for relational proximity homophily including familial ties, religion, and race (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Lieberson, 1980; Higgins, Crepalde, and Fernandes, 2021). Geographic and spatial proximity often serve as a natural, low effort precursor to forming friendships and other connections (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Verbrugge, 1977), including where legislators are seated (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Calderia and Patterson, 1987). In addition to affecting the development of crossties, where legislators sit could also influence their propensity to vote along party lines or in a bipartisan manner (Caldeira and Patterson, 1987). Proximity contributes to the "thickness," or quality, of relationships, with those in closer quarters often experiencing higher frequency and multiple ties (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Gender and proximity can also interact to influence tie development. Women, particularly compared to older men, are more likely to connect with neighbors, fostering multiplex ties that combine geographic proximity with social connections (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also Moore, 1990; Fischer and Oliker, 1983; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1986; Fischer, 1982).

Values Homophily

While *status homophily* is relatively easy to discern, *value homophily*, particularly in areas like political affiliation, can lead to even stronger connections within multiplex ties. McPherson et al. (2001) found that those with strong political homophily demonstrate more fervent engagement, including joining member-based organizations like ALEC. These organizations foster new, and strengthen existing, network ties beyond workplaces and, due to structural characteristics, male network members are especially likely to capitalize on these multiplex connections (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; see also McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1982). This membership effect may also drive legislative behavior; researchers have noted similar patterns regarding joint committee members' friendships, perspectives, voting patterns, and sponsorship rates (McPherson, Smith-

Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Caldeira and Patterson, 1987; see also Cook, 2000). In fact, Caldeira and Patterson (1987) noted that committee membership was second only to political party in influencing friendship ties among legislators, with spatial proximity also being a key contributor. McPherson et al. (2001) note that affiliation within member-based entities often fosters greater camaraderie among members, producing *inbred homophily* of more significance than *status homophily*. McPherson et al. (2001) surmised that while *value homophily* could be an even stronger determinant for friendship selection than interpersonal influence, actors often erroneously assume, without evidence, that their friends share their political leanings. Nadel (1957) asserted actors within an organization hold both membership and relational roles that affect their behavior (Brieger, 1974). (However, as we previously noted, an actor's agency and unwillingness to pay the membership tax by following the group's norms may result in defection (Hoskins et al., n.d.).) These strengthened multiplex ties can create echo chambers and limit exposure to diverse perspectives, potentially hindering collaboration within networks.

Data and Variables

For this study, we constructed a dataset encompassing 27 Arkansas state legislators. Employing an internet search strategy, we ascertained their co-attendance at American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) "events" transpiring during the designated observation window, ranging from 2011 to 2022. Using JavaScript and multidimensional scaling (MDS), we created a valued, undirected squared matrix of bipartite network of politicians (27) and a graphical depiction of their co-participation in ALEC activities. Our analysis revealed significant network party and gender homophily. While data on the legislators' tenure, geographic constituency[2], and chamber service were collected, these variables were ultimately excluded from the previous analysis. Gender and political affiliation were included in the initial SNA; they were reflected by circle/square and blue/red.

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[2] Geographic constituency reflects the region (or counties) represented by the Arkansas legislator when they were first elected. For our analysis, we coded the regions "North", "NWA" (for Northwest Arkansas), and "Central." Northwest and Central Arkansas are somewhat overrepresented while legislators from the Delta participate infrequently in ALEC activities. The legislators in this sample are obviously more conservative than the chambers as a whole and are more likely to be Republican. While they are somewhat over-represented of Republican female legislators, they are somewhat underrepresented of female legislators as a whole and unrepresentative of the racial composition of the entire legislature. Since participation in ALEC events is not random, this factor limits the overall generalizability of the study.

Using an exponential random graph model, we include them now as explanatory variables to assess the presence of multiplex ties between the Arkansas legislators.

Methodology

Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs) offer researchers a powerful and flexible toolkit for understanding a variety of social networks. These networks include political connections (Fowler et al., 2011; Gaynor, 2022; Heaney, 2014), adolescent friendship patterns (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris, 2009), cultural aspects of European creative organizations (Basov and Brennecke, 2017), social cohesion and influence within Brazilian slum communities (Higgins, Crepalde, and Fernandes, 2021), and adults learning English as a second language (Gallagher and Robins, 2015). These diverse applications showcase the versatility of ERGMs in analyzing various social network structures. ERGMs allow scholars to move beyond merely describing a social network to inferring the factors influencing its life cycle (Knoke and Yang, 2020).

In addition, ERGMs support the analysis of several network structures, including those with binary, directed, and undirected connections, and can handle large networks, although computational challenges may increase with size (Knoke and Yang, 2020). Rooted in several theoretical principles (see Lusher et al., 2012), the models presume ties are formed through proximate and intentional (e.g., self-organized) reciprocal, transitive, and homophilous interactions; the influence of structural, nodal, and other attributes is reflected in tie formation; structural shifts impact the network's composition; the network's processes are dynamic and constantly moving at once; and, an element of randomness is inherent to the structure (Yang, Keller, and Zheng, 2017).

Furthermore, ERGMs not only permit users to estimate and make statistical inferences about social network relationships, including the presence of reciprocity and homophily (Yang, Keller, and Zheng, 2017), but also overcome the limitations of traditional methods in analyzing the interdependence of ties based on multiple variables and random sampling (Knoke and Yang, 2020). This allows researchers to utilize ERGMs to understand a variable's likelihood to affect the network based on the model's parameters (Knoke and Yang, 2020); explain the formation and transition of ties based on structural, actor, environmental, and temporal factors (Knoke

and Yang, 2020); and illuminate the mechanisms underlying social network connections, including reciprocity and transitivity (Yang, Keller, and Zheng, 2017). ERGMs can even guide researchers to the optimal path by accounting for the total number of reciprocated ties within a network compared to its average (Yang, Keller, and Zheng, 2017). For these reasons, we elected to leverage an ERGM for this study.

Findings

Computationally, an ERGM is essentially a generalized linear model with logit link, i.e., $\log [P(Y_{ij} = 1)/(1-P(Y_{ij} = 1))]$, where i and j stand for two nodes, and $Y_{ij} = 1$ denotes the connection between i and j. We employ this framework to analyze the network of twenty-seven politicians, depicted in Figure 1, revealing the interplay between individual attributes and connection patterns. Notably, the network contains eighty-six connections, resulting in an average density of 24.5% (86 out of 27*26/2 possible connections), suggesting substantial interconnectedness. Using the nominal variables "Party," "Gender," Region," and "Chamber," we discern the level of homophily (the tendency to connect with similar others) and heterophily (the tendency to connect with different others) present. We use an ordinal variable, "Tenure-Temporal in Office," to represent the number of overlapping peers and to assess whether politicians with more overlapping tenures tend to establish more connections within the network.

An ERGM was fitted using the "ergm" function from the R package "ergm" to explore the network of politician connections. Table 1 summarizes the key findings, with maximum pseudo-likelihood estimates (MPLE) for each variable and their corresponding standard errors and p-values.

The variable "edges" serves as the intercept term in the ERGM, meaning that there is a $\exp(-2.279)/(1+ \exp(-2.279)) = 9.3\%$ chance that two politicians at baseline levels of all variables (that is, Tenure-Temporal in Office are both 0, different party affiliation, different genders, different regions and different chamber categories) are connected. Consistent with existing research, party affiliation exhibits strong homophily, implying politicians from the same party are more likely to connect (with odds ratio $\exp(2.316) = 10.13$, i.e., the odds of same-party connection are

Table 1: Estimated ERGM[3]

Variables	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
edges	-2.279	1.062	0.032*
Tenure-Temporal in office	-0.043	0.213	0.840
Party	2.316	0.885	0.009*
Gender	-0.558	0.271	0.040*
Region	-0.605	0.267	0.023*
Chamber	-0.420	0.273	0.125

around 10 times the one of different-party connection). Conversely, both gender and region exhibit heterophily: politicians of different genders are more likely to connect (with odds ratio exp(0.558) = 1.75), and politicians from different regions of the state are more likely to connect (with odds ratio exp(0.605) = 1.83).

Analysis

Our study examines how the homophilous, multiplex ties of members in a political network could affect their decision to network outside the official legislative session with other legislators. To test this theory, we leverage an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to analyze the multiplex connections of policymakers serving in Arkansas' "hybrid" legislature between 2011-2022 while engaged with the prominent, conservative-oriented entity, ALEC. These ties include political party, geographical location, chamber of service, overlapping tenures, and gender. By analyzing these multiplex relationships through the ERGM framework, we aim to understand how such connections are formed within the legislator network and how they might influence policymaking within the ALEC-affiliated group.

While individual legislator positions within the network may exhibit some randomness, our ERGM analysis focuses on identifying statistically

[3] A "*" denotes statistical significance at the level of 0.05.

significant patterns of connection based on multiplex ties. Our prior analysis identified significant partisan and gender homophily within the network of Arkansas legislators. The EGRM results support this observation, highlighting the strong influence of political parties in driving homophilous connections. Belden (2005) also found evidence of homophily within the Arkansas legislature, particularly along party lines, during a period of Democrat dominance in the early 2000s. In comparison to Belden's study, our findings denote a partisan shift in the Arkansas legislative network. While the two Democrats in our sample population previously held influential roles within the network, during our observation period the network was heavily skewed towards Republicans, indicating a measure of shared values, or *values homophily*, between the policymakers. These results are clear in Figure 1.

These findings affirm McPherson et al.'s (2001) observation that strong political ties may lead to higher in-group engagement, extending to membership in organizations like ALEC, and fostering great camaraderie between members.

Interestingly, despite having 21 male members and strong gender homophily, the network, as shown in Figure 1, also exhibits significant heterophilous ties with three female legislators standing out as key actors: BR31 occupies a structural hole bridging two distinct gender heterophilous groups of legislators; CL23 is the sole female in a closely clustered group of male colleagues; and, LA46 is a peripheral network member tied to a small group of male legislators. Several factors could have contributed to this network structure, including the shared values we previously discussed, which could encompass both political and non-political common ground. While this finding aligns with existing research indicating friendship ties are likely to develop between genders and minority members in heterophilous structures (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris, 2009; Hearney and McClurg, 2009), it is a stark contrast to Belden's (2005) study of the Arkansas legislature where study participants viewed the legislature as male dominant with no female leaders.

Figure 1:

Network visualization, where each node represents a politician (square –
Democratic, circle – Republicans; lighter gray field– female, darker gray –
male; white letters – North Arkansas, darker letters Northwest or Central
Arkansas), and a tie indicates that two politicians had co-participated in
some event(s).

Beyond these observations of gender and partisan homophily, we examined additional legislator attributes including region of representation, chamber of service, and shared tenure. Ties are likely to develop between neighbors, co-workers sitting in close proximity, legislators on the same committees, and those from the same social class (Shipilov, 2012; Verbrugge, 1977, 1979; Liu et al., 2019; Voelker, 2013; McPherson et al.; Hout, 1982; Hauser, 1982; Marsden, 1987; Louch, 2000; Yamaguchi, 1990). Our model used the region represented by the legislator as a proxy for geographic proximity. For example, legislators BR31, CL23, and LA46, all from Central Arkansas, likely connected due to this regional influence. Interestingly, despite the first network member (HO49) being from the North region (which had four members representing, or 14.8% of the population), this group primarily formed ties with legislators from the Central and NWA regions. This pattern suggests *status homophily* (which we previously noted were traits acquired or developed by the network members), as the Central and NWA regions share similarities in demographics and economic characteristics. Belden (2005) also considered the geographical differences in Arkansas, noting that NW Arkansas (and a small portion of Central Arkansas) was viewed by policymakers as affluential and elite in comparison to other parts of the state.

Our ERGM results did not reveal a strong association between legislators forming connections solely based on serving in the same chamber or during the same timeframe. Several factors might explain this, including personality or ideological differences, limited opportunities to interact due to lack of proximity, the influence of past negative interactions and the anticipation of future conflict, and the demanding workload of legislators. Further research is needed to explore these possibilities in greater detail.

Understanding the Significance of BR31's Network Position

Scholars have argued that an individual with both BR31's status homophily (e.g., tenured elected official with deep political and geographic ties) and values homophily (e.g., conservative Republican and ALEC affiliate) would be positioned to exert considerable influence on policy decisions and situate her to become a key opinion leader within the network structure. BR 31's role shouldn't be a surprise though considering she serves in prominent roles in both the Revenue and Taxation Committee as well as the Insurance and Commerce Committee. Much of this research has followed Kingdon's (1973) example and focused on the verbal and nonverbal cues of policymakers intended to affect their legislative peers' behavior, and

we think that her presence both in formal legislative positions and informal ALEC ones are likely to magnify her influence in this capacity.

In one study, Ray (1982) compared roll call voting data from the House chambers of three Eastern states – Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania – to determine which legislators' votes were most influential. These states were chosen for their varying levels of legislative professionalism, determined by factors such as low membership turnover, standalone offices, access to professional staff, and more. The study also considered "congressional voting cues," which included both intentional and unintentional efforts by legislators to convey their preferences, such as committee reports and recommendations on proposed bills. The findings showed that legislatures behaved differently based on their level of professionalism. More professional legislatures were influenced by party leadership, fellow legislators like BR31, interest groups, and constituents. In contrast, less professional legislatures were swayed by constituents, interest groups, and committee reports and recommendations.

In their study of California's legislature, Sabatier and Whiteman (1985) compared the fit of Porter's (1974) two-stage model for assessing legislative decisions to their own three-stage model. They argued for a broader approach than just voting data, highlighting the role of legislative experts, often committee chairs or tenured policymakers, who set the agenda and craft policy options with input from others. Sabatier and Whiteman further categorized the information legislators receive into two types: "political information" concerning public sentiment and its influence, and "policy information" regarding the legislative content, its causes, and potential effects. They acknowledged that these categories can sometimes overlap. The results of both models demonstrated that non-specialist legislators were positioned to receive filtered, potentially biased information, while specialist legislators like BR31 directly influenced their voting choices by providing policy knowledge and insights, including the policy and political information they had gathered from other sources.

Mooney (1991) examined Wisconsin legislators' consumption of written materials related to 17 policy proposals. His study found that fellow legislators and interest groups were the most influential sources of information for legislators. Mooney argued that legislators' focus on specific written materials indicated a higher level of interest in a particular policy proposal, leading them to develop a deeper understanding of the issue. Handwritten notes and memos from colleagues were the most frequently

consumed source, followed by materials from executive agencies and interest groups. Proximate (or homophilous) traits related to work and other experiences appear to have increased the legislators' receptiveness to information from their peers and relevant stakeholders, suggesting these traits provide information bearers like BR31 with "insider information" or a "facilitation mechanism" for message conveyance. Further, the risk of receiving biased information from these expert legislators may not be a deterrent for those legislative peers seeking information. While this study examined the use of written information, Mooney predicted that oral communication would likely affirm findings about the influence of status homophily on legislators.

According to Belden's (2005) findings, a policymaker like BR31 would be in a key position to set the agenda and influence her legislative connections to vote in a way that aligns with her policy objectives, objectives that could reflect ancillary engagement (e.g., ALEC network ties). Her central position should provide her with the necessary and advantageous insight to facilitate this communication. Being viewed as a credible (or trustworthy) source of useful, relevant, and easily understandable policy and political information because of access to experts within her network would effectively render the policymaker an "expert" who fills a critical need held by her fellow legislators. Her position as an expert would be further solidified if she elects to sponsor legislation that reflects this information, she has achieved seniority, or she holds a leadership or membership role on a related committee. Belden notes that, while this information could be available through state regulatory agencies, the political environment may discourage legislators from pursuing that avenue, despite the potential for bias in external information.

In a more recent, longitudinal study of legislative influence, Wilson (2022) examined co-sponsorship patterns in seven states: Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Carolina. The study builds on Dahl's 1957 theory (and other political science studies) that network members influence each other's actions by exerting power. Wilson acknowledges that 1) these ties can be influenced by multiple sources simultaneously and 2) legislators can act as both cue givers and receivers. She categorized legislative decision-making as either directional (influenced by party or ideological similarity) or spatial (influenced by values similarity). The study found a lower level of cue giving occurs in less professional legislatures, affirmed majority parties generally possessed more influence, and found female legislators wielded a significant amount of influence,

especially with Democrats. The cues from ideological extremists were found to be significantly more influential than moderates in ideologically heterogeneous legislatures. Also, legislative leadership was not found to be as influential as ideological extremists, especially among conservative Republicans, possibly due to a history of collaboration among these legislators, committee chairs, and those serving on shared committees. Political elites, like BR31, may benefit in this environment by having a higher level of expertise that results in them making the right calls, establishing themselves as a resource for other legislators to follow. In this regard, committee membership likely serves as a primary avenue for legislators like BR31 to wield influence, especially those who do not hold a significant amount of committee chairmanships during their tenure.

Shifting Power Dynamics in Arkansas Politics

Building upon the observation of BR31's influential position within the network, this section integrates the historical perspectives of Blair and Barth (2005), Belden (2005), and Davis (2024) to examine the broader shift in power dynamics within Arkansas politics. As previously discussed, BR31's potential advantage may be attributed to factors such as party affiliation, engagement with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and regional ties. Historically, the Democratic Party maintained a dominant position in Arkansas since statehood. However, the early 2000s marked a significant rise of the Republican Party. In 2004, Democrats controlled over 70% of the legislative seats. By 2021, this balance had reversed, with Republicans holding more than 70% of the legislature. This dramatic shift had a profound impact on the state's political landscape, potentially fostering an environment where elites within the Republican Party increasingly control the legislative agenda.

While some might perceive this change as sudden, a closer examination reveals several underlying forces that facilitated this transition, including Winthrop Rockefeller's investments, the progressive ambitions of the Big Three (i.e., Dale Bumpers, Bill Clinton, and David Pryor), and the state's traditionalistic political culture. Rockefeller's strategic investments and political efforts laid the groundwork for Republican growth, while the Big Three's progressive policies and national prominence redefined the Democratic Party's influence (see Blair and Barth, 2005). Additionally, Arkansas's traditionalistic political culture, characterized by a preference for established hierarchies and resistance to rapid change, created fertile ground for these shifts in power dynamics. This nuanced understanding underscores

the complexity of Arkansas's political evolution and the interplay of historical and contemporary factors shaping its current landscape.

In the wake of continued investment in the GOP state party over the last two decades (Davis, 2024) and the vacuum created by the retirement of Barth and Blair's Big Three, a stronger, more organized Republican Party emerged in Arkansas. The newly empowered Arkansas Republicans developed a clear message that aligned with the national platform and resonated with Arkansas voters, resulting in widespread electoral success. However, the era of moderate conservatives like Winthrop Rockefeller also gave way to more ideologically conservative politicians on the right, particularly those whose political aspirations mirrored the Big Three. Aided in part by term limits in the state legislature, these Arkansas Republicans have increasingly been able to achieve their progressive ambitions at a higher rate than their Democratic counterparts by leveraging national network connections like ALEC. Given the reduced time to forge bonds through seniority and the brevity of the legislative sessions, it seems likely that any additional opportunity to network with other legislators is likely to deepen those ties and making advancing policy initiatives more likely as well.

While it may seem unlikely that the two Democratic members of our population served as national chairs of ALEC, it is important to note that the Democratic Party in Arkansas was ideologically conservative until the late 1970s. Further, the current class of elites is largely bound by their racial, gender, religious, and geographic homophilous traits (e.g., white, male, and Christian from Central and Northwest Arkansas), although some with the same *values homophily* and *status homophily* have also been afforded membership.

While our model does not show chamber or tenure as statistically significant factors, they might still influence connection formation. Shared experiences and proximity within the legislature due to chamber and tenure overlap could contribute to friendships and strengthen ties. At first glance, the findings may seem unsurprising. After all, wouldn't Republicans socialize together? However, our findings do show that wasn't always the case and that Democratic legislators once participated in ALEC activities as well. However, over time, as the two parties polarized over the course of the last 15 years, that dual participation ceased. Furthermore, ALEC gives Republican state legislators, who only meet for 90 days in a regular two-year session, additional time to discuss and plan policy with colleagues from

different parts of the state. Given the brevity and level of activity in those sessions, it seems likely that these extended interactions will have a significant effect, especially in the narrow policy areas targeted by the ALEC sessions.

Conclusion

This study builds on the understanding that state legislators often rely on supplemental information from, and significant engagement with, knowledgeable external networks like ALEC. However, while ALEC engagement may lead legislators to coordinate and collaborate more frequently to diffuse its policy ideas, our interest was piqued by the concept of multiplexity, the presence of overlapping connections within a network. By examining legislator attributes beyond ALEC participation and influence, we aimed to understand the factors shaping connections within the Arkansas legislature. We employed an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to analyze how legislator characteristics like partisanship, geography, and shared experiences influence network formation. Importantly, we explored how these factors contribute to multiplex ties, potentially fostering collaboration and impacting legislative behavior. This research highlights the value of social network models and political science theory to understand legislator interactions and the complex web of influences on policymaking. By also examining multiplexity, we shed light on the nuanced factors driving legislator connections and the potential impact of both internal and external networks.

The next goal, after discovering what ties exist, is then to determine how these ties affect public policy outcomes by utilizing the results of this study to offer explanations for legislators' sponsorship behavior and by analyzing these multiplex ties, including factors like friendship and geographical proximity.

Although not directly shown in our initial network visualization, the combined effect of these homophilous and heterophilous connections would likely result in a dense network. This network's density could be further amplified by multiplexity, where legislators have overlapping connections beyond just ALEC participation (e.g., friendships, shared legislative committees and chambers, and workplace and geographic proximity). By better understanding the depth to these ties, we hope that future research will boost our knowledge of how they influence policy outcomes.

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State Whistleblower Protection Laws:
Diffusion of Information and Public Corruption?

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State whistleblower protection laws have been proposed as a means of rooting out corruption in the private and public sectors. But there is no consensus regarding their efficacy. Whether whistleblower protection laws have a causal effect is a largely unanswered question. There is variation in state whistleblower laws with respect to their scope, their enforcement mechanisms, and the design and resources of agencies tasked with their implementation. Examining the relationship between particular characteristics of these policies and a measure of public corruption, we find that scope of the law has significant negative effects. We conclude that if whistleblower protection laws are to have an impact on corruption, the state whistleblower law should not only protect those who report legal violations but those who report ethical violations as well.

Introduction

State whistleblower protection laws have been proposed as a means of rooting out corruption in government and within private firms. But there is no consensus regarding their efficacy. Some observers doubt whether they actually effectively protect whistleblowers. Others believe that they may protect disgruntled employees who make frivolous claims against their employers. Whether whistleblower protection laws actually have a causal effect, or whether they simply emerge after corruption is uncovered or are merely correlated with other reform efforts is a largely unanswered question.

In this paper we propose to describe in considerable detail the variation in state whistleblower laws with respect to their scope, their enforcement mechanisms, and the design and resources of agencies tasked

with their implementation. We will then examine the empirical relationship between particular characteristics of these policies and a measure of public corruption. Using data from across the fifty states, we may be able to identify the spurious relationships that have confused this vein of research. At its core, whistleblower protection laws are about the diffusion of information about the operations of government. By protecting whistleblowers' careers, relevant information regarding ethical or legal breaches or poor performance may reach the attention of policymakers and the public who otherwise would be left in the dark. Of course, the impact of this information is not neutral. Negative information regarding a program, an official, or an agency may be motivated by personal or political animus. How it is used may depend upon the relevant, partisan regime that receives the information.

The analysis to be reported in this paper should address important questions of public ethics, agency design, and policy instruments. In particular, it should inform the never-ending Finer-Friedrich debate over the efficacy of external controls and internal norms and values in encouraging proper conduct among public administrators. If whistleblower protection laws have little impact, other means must be employed to maintain high standards of public service.

This paper proceeds as follows. The following section reviews social science research dealing with the origins and effects of state whistleblower laws. It also covers scholarly research on public corruption in the American states in general. The next section discusses whistleblower protection laws as well as other institutional reforms as a way of spreading information outside of agencies and outside of the organizational chain of command in order to maintain greater performative, legal, and ethical accountability. An empirical analysis of state-level data on the effects of the presence of different whistleblower protection measures is described in the following section. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings and implications of the analysis.

Background on Corruption

Corruption is a worldwide problem. There is no country that is free from corruption. Transparency International issues an annual report on the state of corruption in the world. Transparency International defines corruption as the "abuse of entrusted power for private ends" (Transparency International 2024). Countries are given a score for public sector corruption perception, the score ranges from zero to 100 with zero meaning corruption

free and 100 meaning fully corrupt. No country is perceived to be corruption free. The 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) indicates the country perceived as least corrupt is Norway, with a score of 90%. The US gets a score of 69%, ranking as the 24th least corrupt country in the world (Transparency International 2022).

Government sees corruption as a problem. In fact, one of the biggest causes of the US budget deficit is the increased spending on the two healthcare programs, Medicaid and Medicare. The politicians' common mantra is that one important way to deal with the ballooning costs is dealing with fraud, waste, and abuse. When the government sees a problem, the lawmakers come up with laws to deal with these problems. One way to deal with corruption is to encourage whistleblowing. This is done by protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. There are a number of federal and state laws intended to encourage whistleblowing by protecting and sometimes rewarding whistleblowers: "At both the federal and state level, the trend is toward greater legal protection for whistleblowers against the retaliatory acts of the employers" (Barnett 1992, 440).

Whistleblowing

Whistleblowing as a practice in the American government has been around for quite a long time, but the concept and the term "whistleblowing" did not become widely used until the 1970s (Olesen 2022). *Qui tam* lawsuits that rewarded whistleblowers for reporting activities that were wasting public money became common around the time of the Civil War. In that same era the False Claims Act provided some financial incentive for the reporting of false claims for government largesse. More recently, many federal statutes have been enacted which provide protection for whistleblowers (Fiorelli 2020). These statutes include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and the Whistleblower Protection Act. Many state statutes mirror particular features of federal laws (see Goza, Tyner, and Johnson 2013). These statutes vary dramatically regarding the protections, rewards, liabilities, and duties pertinent to whistleblowers (Feldman and Lobel 2010). The provisions provide some insulation from adverse employment actions for current employees, but they usually provide little help to personnel who seek out employment with other organizations in the future (Eisenstadt and Pacella 2018).

According to Schultz and Harutyunyan (2015), whistleblowing is the "act of an individual within an organization who discloses information in

order to report and correct corruption" (87). Whistleblowing laws have been around for decades but there are many questions that remain unanswered, and debates unsettled:

> For nearly five decades, debates about whistleblower laws have addressed several often hotly contested issues. The issues included whether anonymous whistleblowing should be permitted or prohibited, should be fostered or discouraged; whether national security information enjoys priority and lies outside the general scope of whistleblower laws; whether whistleblowing should be described principally from legal or ethical perspectives; and whether internal disclosures should be permitted, protected or required, should be central or peripheral. All of these issues arouse current controversy that dominates our contemporary discussion. The longevity of these disputes signals their importance and attests to their role in defining the successes and failures of whistleblower laws (Vaughn 2012, 332).

The stories of whistleblowers that entered the popular culture do not encourage whistleblowing. Two movies based on real stories come to mind. There is the police officer whistleblower, Serpico. The movie starts with the scene of Serpico being shot in the face and then tells the story of police corruption and Serpico's struggles as a whistleblower. Another movie that popularized the knowledge of the struggles of whistleblowers is The Insider. Jeffrey Wigand, a tobacco industry whistleblower, suffers immense personal and professional losses. Watching these characters go through so much hardship makes the viewer ask many questions. Among these questions: Given the challenges, why would anyone decide to be a whistleblower? Why is the system failing whistleblowers? What can be done to make it easier to be a whistleblower and for the system to be effective?

Essentially, whistleblower protection laws are concerned with the diffusion of information which may be costly to provide. Government officials, employees, and contractors may have information concerning illegal or unethical conduct, but they may suffer reprisals if they share that information with others. In other words, the cost of spreading the information may be very high, while the benefits to the individual sharing the information may be non-existent. The benefits to society of having access to this information may be enormous. Essentially, this involves a collective action problem where the collectivity may be much better off with the relevant information but individuals within the collectivity may suffer harm if they provide the information. Information in general is an unusual

commodity in that normally it suffers from limited exclusion. For example, if one individual has information and he or she shares that information with another, both the original person with the information and those with whom it is shared retain the information. Furthermore, once shared, the information can be shared with an unlimited number of other individuals. In the case of information that is profitable to use, limits on the access and use of information are often imposed temporarily through copyright and patent laws. This presumably provides an incentive to generate more useful information. In the case of information of government wrongdoing, there may not be any monetary incentive to provide and share the information, although there may be some moral incentive or political advantage for doing so.

There is an awareness of the link between unethical conduct and illegal conduct in the military:

> The military has been rocked in recent months by a wide-ranging Navy contracting scandal, involving allegations of bribes, as well as by high-profile sexual assault cases and other probes.
> Last week, the Air Force announced that a test-cheating scandal involving nuclear missile crews was more widespread than previously thought, with 92 junior officers suspended in connection with cheating allegations.
> In the interview, Gen. Dempsey said he and the military service chiefs were working together on a series of initiatives that will place a renewed focus on military ethics (Yousef 2021).

There is evidence from the military setting of the link between ethics and criminal conduct. A Rand study quoted in The Wall Street Journal found a connection between the prevalence of sexual harassment and the incidence of the crime of sexual assault:

> Researchers then compared the incidence of sexual assault, finding that service members working in climates that have a higher prevalence of sexual harassment also run a higher risk of sexual assault. (Schell et al. 2021).

Although some scholars regard culture as important, culture may be changed. A culture that is rife with unethical behavior is more conducive to criminality. When whistleblowers are protected for reporting ethical violations as well, a norms-based preventive policy is created. Norms are not going to be created if whistleblowers who report unethical conduct are not also protected just as those who report criminal activity. There is military

scholarship exploring the importance of institutional culture and sexual assault and how to change the culture to create a "norms-based preventive policy" (Bennett 2018, 707).

There is also recognition of the importance of ethics in the private sector. It is not enough to screen, monitor and punish, Gross-Schaefer et al. (2000) propose changing the culture through ethics education. The goal is to create an ethical culture that will serve as a preventive policy as to illegality. One of the biggest scandals in corporate America is the Healthsouth scandal. One of the former CEOs blamed the scandal on the slippery slope. The CEO Scrushy asked them for minor unethical violations. These unethical violations over time snowballed into massive criminality (Beam and Warner 2009).

Whistleblower protection laws are presumed to facilitate the diffusion of information about government wrongdoing that otherwise would not be revealed to the public. Different state laws have different provisions that might affect this flow of information. Some laws provide protection for whistleblowers who report illegal activities. Other states have laws that are broader in scope. They offer protection for reports of activities that are allegedly unethical or wasteful as well as illegal. Thus, potential whistleblowers who believe they know of suspect activity but are not certain that it is illegal do not need to fear retribution if the reported activity is subsequently determined to be lawful.

Some states have whistleblower protection laws that require protected reporting to a single authority, usually a law enforcement agency or officer. This limits the flow of information to a single channel. Other states allow whistleblowers to submit reports to any of multiple contact points. This provides some redundancy of options for the flow of information. This should increase the probability that the information will flow ultimately to the public (see Bendor 1985; Landau 1969).

Another provision that appears in some states' whistleblower protection law but not in others pertains to the material incentive to report misconduct. At a minimum, these laws offer injunctive relief and generally reinstatement and back pay for employees dismissed from their positions for making a report. But other states offer greater incentives, such as punitive damages in civil suits against the government. Hence, a whistleblower could be made materially better off after whistleblower retaliation than they would

be before the fact. This could encourage more reports than if only reinstatement were offered.

There are a number of federal laws and state laws designed to encourage whistleblowing and protect whistle-blowers. The universe of federal and state whistle-blower protection laws has been described as a "maze of laws" (Kohn and Kohn 1986, 100). There are a number of federal whistle-blowing statutes and all the states and the District of Columbia have whistleblowing statutes (West and Bowman 2019). The US is a leading country in providing a template for whistle-blowing laws and many countries and organizations have modeled their laws and rules on American laws (Johnson 2003). In their review of American whistle-blowing laws, Schultz and Harutyunyan (2015) chose to exclude state laws claiming "[I]t would be impossible to document all of the whistleblowing laws in the United States" (89). While in an international setting, it is easier to focus on federal laws only, state laws cannot be ignored since most legal issues that come up in the American system are state issues, not federal issues. Therefore, state laws are very important to study. A 1992 study found that only thirty-three states had whistle-blower statutes (Barnett 1992, 440). In their article, West and Bowman (2020) using FindLaw, identified the whistle-blowing laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia and presented them in an accessible table format.

There is a cynicism regarding whether the whistle-blower laws work. Martin (2003) identifies a number of problems or weaknesses with whistleblower legislation. One of these problems is that the law "comes into play only after disclosures have been made and reprisals have begun" (Martin 2003, 120). He argues that "a much more productive approach is to promote the development of understanding and practical skills for whistleblower survival in organizations" (Martin 2003, 120). Sinzdak (2008) argues that whistle-blower law reporting requirements are a problem:

> Unfortunately, most current state whistleblower laws do not provide adequate protection. The overwhelming majority of states impose inflexible report recipient requirements on whistleblowers and deny protection to those individuals who make reports to disfavored recipients. Most states require employees to file a complaint with an external government body. In the states that adopt this rule, individuals who make only internal reports receive no state statutory protection. A few states utilize the opposite rule, requiring employees to report internally to receive legal protection from

retaliation. Virtually no state allows reporting to the media or other nongovernmental third parties. (1668).

Sinzdak advocates for a flexible report recipient standard that allows internal, external, or media reporting.

In a first comprehensive study of state whistle-blower laws, West and Bowman (2020) use content analysis, interviews and surveys to determine the effectiveness of state whistle-blower laws, they ask: "What is the scope, content, and perceived effectiveness of these [whistle-blower] provisions? In the analysis reported here, we examine the effect of particular components of these laws.

 Data and Methods

The critical explanatory variable for this analysis are particular provisions of state whistleblower protection laws. In their ARPA article, Bowman and West (2020) classified state laws around certain dimensions. In this analysis, we coded state whistleblower protection laws to create three different variables. The first, the scope of the law, is coded as "1" if the state provided protection to whistleblowers who reported not only legal violations in government but also ethical misdeeds, abuse of the powers of office, and/or fraudulent behavior (which could be a civil as well as a criminal offense). States that provide protection only for whistleblowers reporting legal violations are coded as "0." By providing protection for reporters of broad categories of alleged misconduct, a great deal of information about government operations may be disseminated. This may provide the basis for investigations that may uncover many misdeeds, some of which are prosecutable.

The second provision is whether the whistleblower reports can be reported to multiple recipients or must be reported to a single access point. By providing multiple access points, whistleblowers can choose a venue where they feel most confident they will be protected. If there is only one official or office to which a report can be sent, whistleblowers may fear that their reports will not be kept confidential and may lead to unwanted repercussions. States with statutes that provide multiple access reports are coded as "1" while states with a single access point are coded as "0."

The third provision is the nature of remedies for the whistleblower or penalties for the agencies that punish a whistleblower. In some states,

injunctive relief is available if an agency disciplines a whistleblower. The employee may return to his or her job if dismissed, but they may receive no monetary compensation. Other states provide a cause of action for whistleblowers to sue for damages against the office or officers that punish them. Some states make retaliation against whistleblowers a criminal offense. In this analysis, states that provide civil penalties with financial liability and/or states that make retaliation a criminal offense are coded as "1" while other states are coded as"0." The data sources for the coding of these variables were the state statutes which were listed in the Bowman and West article. A few additional statutes were used while perusing the statutory provisions referenced by Bowman and West (2020).

Because whistleblower-provided information may be used for partisan advantage, to attack political rivals through investigations and prosecutions, the analysis contains variables for partisan control of state government. States were coded dichotomously based on the presence or absence of GOP control of both the legislature and the governor's office, as well as simply the presence of a Republican governor, or the control of the state legislature by the GOP. Variables for divided government and split partisan control of the state legislature were also coded. These data were drawn from the 2018 and 2019 *Book of the States* (The Council of State Governments 2018; 2019). Data on state ideology were also used as a control variable, relying upon the percentage of state survey respondents who categorized themselves as conservative, using a 2015 Pew Research Center study (https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/compare/political-ideology/by/state/). Because a Democratic president was in office at the time the data on the dependent variable were collected, we expect that conservative and/or Republican controlled states would have higher rates of reported corruption than would other states. That is not necessarily because those states were more corrupt, but because there might be greater incentive to investigate and prosecute reports of misconduct from those states.

Since the size of government could affect opportunities for corruption, the analysis includes data on the size of state and local government payrolls, in dollars, divided by the state population.

The critical dependent variable in the analysis is corruption for state public corruption. There is a significant debate about the proper way to measure, as well as define, public corruption. Some measures in empirical research on the topic use counts of convictions for corrupt acts, usually in

federal court, while other research uses results of surveys, sometimes of the general population but more commonly from reporters or academics (Cordis and Milyo 2016). This analysis uses the first approach, relying upon counts of convictions of state and local officials for corrupt acts in federal courts. This variable is derived from Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse data for 2022. Unfortunately, the actual numbers for the convictions were not immediately available, so the analysis relies upon ranking of the states in criminal convictions, based on the TRACFED data, drawn from the World Population Review (https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/most-corrupt-states). Only the rankings of states based on corruption convictions. The top ten states in corruption were given a score of 5, the next ten states were assigned a score of 4, and so on.

Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables in the analysis. Several model specifications were run, of which three are reported in the table.

Table 1: State Corruption Scores

Explaining State Corruption Scores 2022			
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Variable			
Constant	0.719	0.23	1.892
	(-0.284)	(0.134)	-1.475
Scope	-1.362**	-1.302**	-1.319
	(-2.726)	(-3.048)	(-3.054)
Reporting	0.172	.234	.211
	(0.417)	(.623)	(.555)
Penalties	-0.161	-.204	-.226
	(-.337)	(-.460)	(-.504)
Conservative Ideology	0.048	.064**	.050*
	(0.756)	(2.091)	(1.702)
GOP Control	-0.443		
	(-.395)		
Divided Government	-.614		
	(.660)		

Legislative Professionalism	-.300		
	(-.125)		
Sunset Law	.730	.786	
	(1.372)	(1.594)	
Payroll/Pop	.005	.004	
	(1.499)	(1.439)	
GOP Legislature	.633		
	(.473)		
Split Legislature	.667		
	(.452)		
R-Square	0.361	0.346	0.314
Adjusted R-Square	0.171	0.254	0.236
F-Statistic	1.898*	3.784**	4.029**
T-Ratios in Parentheses			
**P<.05			
*P<.1			

Results

The first model reveals that the scope of a states' whistleblower protection law has a significant, negative relationship upon the corruption score. This finding is robust to varying model specifications. The reporting and penalties provisions of a state law have no significant effect. The partisan control variables and the size of the public payroll in a state seem to have no impact either. In some models, conservative ideology is positively and significantly related to corruption, although those effects are not as robust or as great in magnitude as the scope of the whistleblower protection law. Eyeballing the data, it appears that some of the most conservative states are Southern states, some of which are also high in corruption, so there may be a regional effect that needs to be considered. A few non-southern states, such as Utah and Idaho, are also quite conservative but are very low in corruption. Control variables for the year of adoption and the year of the most recent amendment for the whistleblower protection laws were included in some models, but had no significant effect and are not reported here.

Conclusion

Our findings as to the significance of scope data results take us back to the Finer-Friedrich debate. Many years ago Carl Friedrich (1940) argued that internal checks such as professional values and standards were ideal for maintaining ethical conduct among public administrators. Herman Finer (1941) countered by claiming that internal checks were insufficient and that external controls were necessary to keep public officials honorable. State laws providing whistleblowers some protection certainly qualifies as an external control, since the law is leveraging some employees to report violations by another employee. Yet agencies with protected whistleblowers may encourage the formation of internal norms. We propose that having whistleblower protection for the reporting of ethical violations ends up changing the norms and values of the organization. We assume that action is taken against the individuals engaged in ethical violations. This could deter unethical conduct and provide some encouragement to personnel who wish to work in an ethical organization. The ethical standard is higher than the legal standard, therefore fewer criminal violations. The external control over ethical violations leads to internal norms and values that act as a preventative to criminal conduct. Nevertheless as previously mentioned, a culture that is rife with unethical behavior is more conducive to criminality. When whistleblowers are protected for reporting ethical violations as well, a norms-based preventive policy is established. Norms are not going to be created if whistleblowers who report unethical conduct are not also protected just as those who report criminal activity.

The data results reveal that a whistleblower believes that they are protected in reporting not only legal violations but also ethical abuses that may spur investigations that could ultimately uncover prosecutable crimes. The overall analysis demonstrated there is a strong, statistically significant negative impact on the corruption index for the scope of the whistleblower laws. However, the reporting and penalties variables had virtually no effect. Notably, the financial rewards for whistleblowers seem to have little effect. This may be because, according to Alford (2001), potential whistleblowers are not self-seeking, but are more likely to be motivated by an awareness of their historical moment, identification with victims, and a reluctance to "double" (i.e., act in one way in one set of circumstances but in another in other circumstances).

Regarding the conservative ideology variable, the table 1 results illustrated that while sometimes statistically significant, it is not robust. This

may be the result of a regional states effect. The Southern region of states are usually among the most conservative but some also are the most corrupt (e.g., Louisiana). In contrast, some conservative states, such as Utah and Idaho, are not listed high on the corruption score at all. Moreover, the Southern region falls under a traditionalist political culture by Daniel Elazar (1984) who argued that party competition will tend to occur between factions within a dominant party. The lack of a competitive two-party system in the southern states may account for more patronage appointments and higher levels of corruption within the dominant party structure. Another possible explanation for the findings lends support to the variation of the resource curse argument that is prominent in comparative politics literature (see, e.g. DiJohn 2010). For example, while Louisiana, Montana, and South Dakota economies are dependent on the extraction of natural resources, they are also high on the corruption score.

For further research, a longitudinal study could add more clarity to the question of whether state whistleblower laws are becoming more effective in the United States of America or not. Furthermore, this analysis did not examine "duty to report" requirements, which often appear in enabling legislation for particular programs and agencies but which may not be explicitly stated in whistleblower protection laws.

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The 9/11 Generation: An Analysis of College Student Attitudes Regarding U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-September 11th Period

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The terrorist attacks of September 11th arguably had a significant impact on the foreign policy attitudes of American citizens, including members of the Millennial Generation and Generation Z. This study seeks to better understand the foreign policy attitudes of younger Americans who entered colleges and universities during the past decade. More than 1,600 students were surveyed regarding their attitudes on foreign policy between the Fall 2014 and Spring 2022 semesters. The survey showed that most respondents supported active and multilateral involvement in international affairs, as well as the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives. The results of statistical analyses indicated that variations in student attitudes regarding internationalism, multilateralism, and militarism were significantly impacted by their perceptions of the role of the United Nations, perceptions of the international environment, primary source of news about international affairs, amount of exposure to international news, international travel, and educational level of parents.

Introduction

Along with the Japanese military attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States military involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are undoubtedly among the defining events that have significantly shaped U.S. foreign policy during the past century (Leffler 2003). The 9/11 terrorist

attacks and their aftermath have arguably also had a significant impact on the foreign policy attitudes of American citizens, particularly members of the Millennial Generation ("Generation Y") who were born during the last two decades of the 20th century (Thrall and Goepner 2015). To date, few studies have focused on the foreign policy attitudes of the younger members of the Millennial Generation, as well as the older members of the subsequent generation ("Generation Z"), who were born just before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11th.[1] We refer to this group of Americans as the "9/11 Generation."[2] This study is an attempt to better understand the foreign policy attitudes of these young Americans who entered U.S. colleges and universities during the past decade. Specifically, the present study focuses on two related questions. First, what are the general attitudes of American college students regarding U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 period and are these foreign policy attitudes largely different from or similar to those of the broader American public? Second, what are some explanations for the variations in the attitudes of college students regarding U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 period?

To answer these questions, more than 1,600 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory political science courses at a comprehensive, four-year public university in the U.S. South were surveyed about their attitudes regarding foreign policy and international affairs between the Fall 2014 and Spring 2022 semesters. Most of the college students surveyed in this study were born between the years 1994 and 2004. Although only a few of the college students would have had direct memories of the events of September 11th, most of them were old enough to have been aware of the subsequent U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of the college students may even have had family members or friends who served in the military in one or both countries.[3]

The results of the surveys conducted for this study indicate that a majority of the respondents held foreign policy attitudes that are comparable

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[1] One recent study that did focus on the foreign policy attitudes of undergraduate college students was Drury et al. 2010.

[2] See Towns, Eleni. "The 9/11 Generation: How 9/11 Shaped the Millennial Generation," Center for American Progress, September 8, 2011, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-911-generation/.

[3] See "Chapter 5: The Public and the Military," *War and Sacrifice in the Post-9/11 Era,* Pew Research Center, October 5, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2011/10/05/chapter-5-the-public-and-the-military/.

to the general American public. Similar to the results of recent national
surveys of the foreign policy attitudes of the general American public, this
study found that younger Americans, specifically college students, support
active U.S. involvement in international affairs, multilateral U.S.
involvement in international affairs, and the use of military force to achieve
U.S. foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, the results of this study suggest
that the foreign policy attitudes of colleges students are coherent and
structured, as previous research over the past few decades has found
regarding the foreign policy attitudes of the general American public.
Statistical analyses in this study suggest that variations in the foreign policy
attitudes of the college students were significantly impacted by their
perceptions of the role of the United Nations, perceptions of the international
environment, reliance on Fox News as the primary source of news about
international affairs, amount of exposure to international news, and
international travel.

The remainder of the article is divided into five parts. After briefly
summarizing prior research on foreign policy attitudes, we provide a
theoretical framework for explaining variations in the foreign policy
attitudes of college students. We then discuss the research design, including
the statistical models that will be estimated and the operationalization of
variables. After providing the results of the statistical analyses and
robustness checks, we discuss the overall findings in the study. We conclude
with some observations about future research on foreign policy attitudes and
an implication of the study for U.S. foreign policymakers.

Structure and Dimensions of Foreign Policy Attitudes

Prior to the mid-1970s, many studies of public opinion in the U.S.
suggested that mass attitudes regarding foreign policy were largely
inconsistent, incoherent, and unstructured (Converse 1964; Lippmann 1922;
Simon 1974). Notably, Gabriel Almond (1950) asserted that foreign policy
attitudes among most Americans "lack intellectual structure and factual
content" (p. 69). Near the end of the Vietnam War, Stephen Bennett (1974)
concluded that "the mass public's foreign policy opinions do not lack
coherence entirely," suggesting that it depended partly on the salience of a
particular foreign policy issue such as the Vietnam War at a given time (p.
742).

More recently, scholars have challenged the so-called "Lippmann-
Almond Consensus", arguing that many Americans hold coherent and

structured foreign policy attitudes (Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992). Many of these more recent studies have suggested that foreign policy attitudes of Americans are multidimensional, as opposed to being structured along a single *internationalism-isolationism* dimension (Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Chittick and Billingsley 1989; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Oldendick and Bardes 1981; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). For example, Barbara Bardes and Robert Oldendick (1978) identified five different dimensions of foreign policy attitudes: *militarism* - level of support for maintaining and, if necessary, using U.S. military force; *involvement* - level of support for U.S. involvement in world affairs; *world problems* - level of support for U.S. involvement in solving worldwide problems such as hunger and arms control; *détente* - level of support for maintaining international peace through cooperation with other world powers; and *international organizations* - level of support for the United Nations and other international organizations (pp. 499-502).

Subsequent studies came to similar conclusions regarding the multidimensional character of U.S. foreign policy attitudes, although these studies differed in terms of the number of dimensions and the specific types of attitudes (Holsti and Rosenau 1990). For example, Michael Maggiotto and Eugene Wittkopf (1981) suggested two dimensions (cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism), which combined to produce four mutually exclusive types of attitudes (*accommodationists, internationalists, isolationists,* and *hardliners*) (pp. 610-612). Later, Ronald Hinckley (1988) argued that there were three "fundamental attitudinal factors underlying American opinions about the means to achieve national security and foreign policy goals," including isolation from or involvement with international affairs; independent or cooperative action; and the use or nonuse of military force (pp. 300-301). Similarly, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) demonstrated a three-dimensional model of foreign policy attitudes, including internationalism-isolationism, multilateralism-unilateralism, and militarism-nonmilitarism. The authors concluded that each of their "three dimensions of foreign policy beliefs adds something to the explanation of specific opinions" of foreign policy issues (p. 323).

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Following the direction of Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis (1995) and Hinckley (1988), we assume that core foreign policy attitudes are structured along three basic dimensions: (a) support for or against active involvement by the U.S. in international affairs (*internationalism–isolationism*); (b) support

for or against multilateral involvement by the U.S. in international affairs (*multilateralism–unilateralism*); and (c) support for or against the use of American military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives (*militarism–nonmilitarism*). Given the three-dimensional structure of foreign policy attitudes, we argue that variations in foreign policy attitudes are generally impacted by an individual's perceptions of the world and the information about the world to which an individual is exposed. In this study, we have identified two perceptual factors and four informational factors that we believe function as filters through which an individual's specific attitudes about foreign policy and international affairs are largely formed: perception of the role of the United Nations; perception of the international environment; primary source of news about international affairs; amount of exposure to international news; international travel; and educational level of parents.

Perception of the Role of the United Nations
        Founded in October 1945, the United Nations facilitates international cooperation across a wide range of issues, including peace and security, human rights, refugees, global environment, and economic development. Given the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of military force by member-states against other states (except in cases of individual or collective self-defense or uses of military force authorized by the UN Security Council), the UN encourages member-states to rely primarily on diplomacy and negotiations over coercion and military action. Only on rare occasions, most notably North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950 and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, has the UN Security Council authorized member-states to use military force to enforce international peace and security (Blokker 2000; Franck 2001). Since the end of the Second World War, most Americans have generally held a favorable opinion about the UN and its importance in international affairs, although this support has varied depending on international events at any given time.[4] In addition, recent surveys have found that young adults in the U.S. have been somewhat more favorable (68%) toward the UN compared to older adults (56%).[5]

        In this study, we suggest that the perceptions of individuals about the role of the UN in the world influence their attitudes about U.S. foreign

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[4] See "Seventy Years of U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations," The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Cornell University, June 22, 2025, https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/.

[5] See "United Nations gets mostly positive marks from people around the world," Pew Research Center, September 23, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/.

policy. Specifically, we argue that college students who perceive that the UN plays an important global role are more likely to value many of the basic principles of the UN, including the peaceful or non-military resolution of international disputes and multilateral cooperation across the wide range of global issues. As such, we expect that college students who perceive that the UN plays an important global role are more supportive of cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy, which would include active, multilateral, and non-military involvement in international affairs.[6]

H1: *College students who perceive that the United Nations plays an important role in the world are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

Perception of the International Environment

      Individuals' attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy and international affairs may be influenced by their perceptions of the international environment (Taydas and Olson 2022). In their study, Brewer et al. (2004) suggested that individuals "with high levels of international trust see the realm of world affairs as a friendly environment where trust and cooperation among nations are the norms" and individuals "with low levels of international trust see the same realm as a hostile environment where all nations strive against one another for advantage" (p. 96). In addition, the authors found evidence that individuals who perceive the international environment as a friendly or non-threatening place were more supportive of internationalism as a general principle and less supportive of the use of military force to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Brewer et al., 2004). Using this same logic, we expect that college students who perceive the world as non-threatening are more supportive of cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy compared to college students who perceive the world as threatening.

H2: *College students who perceive the international environment as generally safe and friendly are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs,*

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[6] Rathbun et al. (2016) define "cooperative internationalism" as an orientation toward international affairs that stresses concern for others abroad, with whom one should work toward common goals" (p. 125).

and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Primary Source of News about International Affairs

Numerous scholars have found that the media in the U.S. have an impact on the political attitudes, voting behaviors, perceptions, and misperceptions of citizens (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Druckman and Parkin 2005; Gadarian 2010; Gil de Zúñiga, Correa, and Valenzuela 2012; Groeling and Baum 2008; Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2003/2004; Ladd and Lenz 2009; Lin 2009). In particular, some scholars have suggested that foreign policy attitudes are particularly susceptible to "media framing," which occurs when the media focuses on specific themes or aspects of an issue in order to influence government policymakers and shape public opinion (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005). Media framing is particularly effective in shaping foreign policy attitudes when a major source of international news, such as a cable news network, rather overtly provides "politically biased news and opinion" in a consistent manner over a period of time (Jones 2012, p. 179). Mark Harmon and Robert Muenchen (2009) found that Fox News was "more likely to use the pro-war terms and less likely to use the anti-war terms" in their broadcast news programs, contributing to support for the use of military force (p. 19). Aday et al. (2005) also found evidence in their study that reporting by Fox News prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in 2003 was clearly biased in favor of the use of military force and that Fox News viewers were highly supportive of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

In this study, we argue that the attitudes of American college students regarding U.S. foreign policy may vary depending on their primary source of media information. Specifically, college students who rely primarily on conservative or right-leaning media, such as Fox News, are more likely to support military and unilateral approaches to U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, college students who rely primarily on liberal or left-leaning media, such as CNN or MSNBC, are more likely to support non-military and multilateral approaches to U.S. foreign policy. We test this proposition by hypothesizing that the foreign policy attitudes of college students whose primary sources of international news are the three major 24-hour cable news networks (Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC) will vary depending on which cable news network they rely for their information. Since viewers of each of these cable news networks have a greater exposure to international news than non-viewers, we expect that both groups of

college students will be more supportive of active U.S. involvement in international affairs, just not in the same manner.

H3a: *College students whose primary source of news about international affairs is Fox News are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to oppose multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

H3b: *College students whose primary source of news about international affairs is CNN or MSNBC are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

Amount of Exposure to International News

Previous studies have found evidence that exposure to information about the world has an impact on the foreign policy attitudes of Americans (Korzenny, del Toro, and Gaudino 1987; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981). These studies have often found that more exposure to international news in newspapers and other traditional forms of media is associated with more supportive attitudes regarding active American involvement with other countries in international affairs. For example, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) found the more closely individuals follow news about international affairs, the "more likely they are to score high on the cooperative internationalism dimension," suggesting that these individuals were more likely to support active and multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs (p. 618). Therefore, we argue that the attitudes of college students regarding U.S. foreign policy should vary depending on the amount of exposure they have to information about international affairs. We expect that college students who have more exposure to international news will be more supportive of cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy compared to college students who have less exposure to international news.

H4: *College students who have more exposure to news about international affairs are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

International Travel

In addition to exposure to international news, an individual's understanding of the world is arguably enhanced through international travel. For most Americans, international travel is their "main direct source of foreign impressions," and individuals who have traveled abroad are better able to incorporate "international considerations" into their thinking (De Sola Pool, Keller, and Bauer 1956, pp. 164-168). In particular, college student participation in international educational programs (i.e., study abroad programs) results in a greater degree of comfort with people of other cultures and a different perspective about the world (Ballantyne 2011). Velta Clarke (2004) found that international travel by college students made a "positive contribution to international attitudes" (p. 62) Likewise, Jerry Carlson and Keith Widaman (1988) concluded that studying abroad "can be an important contributor to international awareness and potentially contribute to attitudes and behaviors that help foster international understanding" (p. 15). Given the results of these previous studies, we argue that college students who have traveled overseas at least once are more supportive of cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy compared to college students who have not previously travelled overseas.

H5: *College students who have traveled outside of the U.S. are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

Educational Level of Parents

Another potential source of information about international affairs for younger individuals is their parents. Since "childhood is a particularly malleable period," parents are known to be one of the primary socialization agents of children (Maccoby 1992, p. 1006). Therefore, we expect that variations in the foreign policy attitudes of college students are influenced, at least in part, by the level of education of their parents. The more education an individual's parents have obtained, the more likely that the individual will be exposed to information about the world, either through the availability of books and magazines, through casual conservations, or through television programs viewed in the home.

In fact, scholars have found evidence that education matters when it comes to foreign policy attitudes in the U.S. One study found that individuals with the least education tended to support militant internationalism and individuals with the most education tended to support

cooperative internationalism (Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983). Several other studies concluded that well-educated individuals are more likely to be internationalists and multilateralists, while less-educated individuals are more likely to be nationalists or isolationists (Hinckley 1988; Schoen 2007; Urbatsch 2010). A study of the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s found that college-educated Americans were less supportive of U.S. military action compared to less-educated Americans (Schuman and Rieger 1992). Similarly, Bardes and Oldendick (1978) found that individuals in higher education groups were less supportive of the use of military force and more supportive of greater U.S. involvement in the world. In making the connection between higher levels of education and internationalism, Brewer et al. (2004) suggested that "support for internationalism among the American public increases with education, presumably because education brings citizens into contact with the pro-internationalism consensus among American political elites" (p. 95). Therefore, since college-educated individuals are more likely to support cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy, we argue that college students whose parents are college-educated are also more likely to support cooperative internationalist approaches to U.S. foreign policy.

H6: *College students whose parents are college-educated are more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.*

Alternative sources of foreign policy attitudes
        There is a possibility that certain ideological, political, and demographic factors - including ideological orientation, political party identification, race, sex, and religious affiliation - play important roles in shaping an individual's attitudes regarding foreign policy and international affairs. While earlier studies downplayed the role of partisan and ideological identifications, as well as certain social-economic factors, in explaining foreign policy attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964; Verba et al. 1967), more recent studies have found some evidence of the significance of ideology, political party, and demographic factors.

        Several scholars have examined the ideological differences in foreign political attitudes in the U.S. Some of these studies have found that conservatives are generally more supportive of the use of military force compared to individuals who identify with other ideologies (Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 1981; Wittkopf and

Maggiotto 1983). Seeking to explain the impact of ideology on foreign policy attitudes, Peter Gries (2014) argued that liberals "tend to question both the efficacy and desirability of the use of force," while the "conservative view that force is both efficacious and normatively justified has a very long history" (pp. 105-106). Rathbun et al. (2016) argued that for conservatives, the "use or threat of force would be a necessary element for controlling an unpredictable environment where there is no recourse to a higher authority" (p. 128). On the other hand, Harald Schoen (2007) suggested that individuals with liberal values are thought to be "more skeptical of armed forces and of the international use of military force than conservatives" (p. 409). Finally, Kertzer et al. (2014) found that "libertarianism is positively associated with isolationism" in their study of the impact of moral values on foreign policy attitudes (p. 835).

Some scholars have also found partisan differences with respect to the foreign policy attitudes of Americans. Many of these studies found that individuals identifying with the Democratic Party tend to be less supportive compared to individuals identifying with the Republican Party when it comes to the use of military force (Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Drury et al. 2010; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Other studies have found that Democrats are more likely to believe that some of the country's problems can be solved by working with other countries (Mordecai and Fagan 2021). Similarly, Robert Urbatsch (2010) found that Democrats are generally more supportive of active and multilateral involvement by the U.S. in international affairs, although foreign policy attitudes may depend on which political party controls the White House at any given time. In other words, the foreign policy attitudes of both Democrats and Republicans may vary depending on the current occupant of the White House. Due to increasing political polarization, both groups may be more supportive of certain foreign policy approaches when their own political party aligns with the political party of the president (Friedrichs and Tama 2022; Maxey 2022; Smeltz 2022).

Studies that have examined the role of race as a source of foreign policy attitudes have generally found that whites are more supportive of the use of military force than non-whites. For example, Val Burris (2008) found that for most of the uses of U.S. military force between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War, whites have been more supportive of military actions than non-whites. With respect to foreign policy attitudes regarding active U.S. involvement in international affairs, Urbatsch (2010) found that "non-whites…are all more likely to sympathize with isolationism" (p. 478).

Several scholars have concluded that the foreign policy attitudes of males and females are generally different, partly because males tend to be more militaristic in their foreign policy attitudes than females (Drury et al. 2010; Togeby 1994; Urbatsch 2010). For example, Burris (2008) found that for most of the uses of U.S. military force from the Vietnam War to the Iraq War, "women indicated less support for military initiatives than men" (p. 459). Providing at least one reason for this difference, Schoen (2007) noted that females are "more risk averse and less inclined to support the use of military force" (p. 409). On the other hand, Bardes and Oldendick (1978) found "virtually no differences between males and females" on their five dimensions of foreign policy attitudes (p. 505).

Finally, some recent studies have explored the relationship between an individual's religious affiliation and foreign policy attitudes in the U.S. (Cavari 2013; Jelen 1994; Wuthnow and Lewis 2008). In their study, Zeynep Taydas and Laura Olson (2022) found that religious affiliation "systematically points Americans in different directions regarding a wide range of foreign policy attitudes" and that the "unaffiliated and Catholics…perceive the world as less threatening than do evangelicals and prefer multilateral, cooperative solutions to international problems" (p. 921). Guth et al. (2005) found that evangelical Christians were more favorable to unilateral actions by the U.S. government in international affairs, while those who were not affiliated with a religion were more favorable to multilateral actions by the U.S. government. Other studies have found that evangelical Christians are generally more supportive of the use of U.S. military force compared to other groups, particularly Roman Catholics and religiously unaffiliated individuals (Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Smidt 2005; Taydas and Olson 2012). Analyzing public opinion regarding the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003, Carolyn Lin (2009) found that while evangelical Christians "continued to express unwavering support for the military action, other mainstream Christian denominations – such as the Methodists and the African American churches – started to speak out against the war" (p. 31).

Research Design

The main hypotheses developed in this study are tested using data compiled from a 15-question survey of 1,607 undergraduate students enrolled in multiple sections of lower-level political science courses offered at a comprehensive, four-year public university in the U.S. South (see

Appendix A).[7] The surveys were administered to students enrolled in these courses at the university during two different periods – Fall 2014 to Spring 2017 and Fall 2019 to Spring 2022.[8] Surveys that were incomplete or completed by students who were not citizens or permanent residents of the U.S. were omitted from the sample.

The aggregate data from the surveys is summarized in Table 1.[9] The foreign policy attitudes of most of the 1,607 college students surveyed for this study reflected support for active U.S. involvement in international affairs, support for multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and support for the use of U.S. military force. As shown in Table 1, some 70 percent of the respondents supported active U.S. involvement in international affairs, 72 percent of the respondents supported multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, 63 percent of the respondents

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[7] Except when the survey was administered electronically due to the Covid-19 pandemic, a hard copy of the survey was distributed to each of the students attending class sessions in each of the selected courses. The surveys were administered by the instructors of the selected courses. Students were given written instructions with the surveys, including the option of choosing not to participate in the survey. During the period of the study, more than 90 percent of the students attending the class sessions completely filled out the survey. Overall, less than ten percent of the surveys were either left blank or were not completely filled out.

[8] The surveys were approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the university in October 2014 and October 2019. The lower-level courses in which the survey was administered included Introduction to Political Science, U.S. Government & Politics, and Introduction to International Relations. Although the latter two courses were required for all students pursuing the political science major at the university, most of the respondents in the sample were students who were not majoring in political science. In fact, most of the students were enrolled in the courses in order to complete specific components of the university's lower-level general education requirements. Consequently, we believe that the sample of students participating in the survey was a reasonably good sample of the overall population of freshmen and sophomore students (excluding international students and other students who were not citizens or permanent residents of the U.S.) who were enrolled at the university during these two periods.

[9] Table 1 includes a summary of some basic demographic characteristics of the survey respondents, which were not significantly different from the basic demographic characteristics of the overall student population at the university. The gender of the survey respondents was 57.4 percent female and 42.6 percent male. By comparison, the proportion of female undergraduate students ranged from 58.5% to 61.0% and male undergraduate students ranged from 39.0% to 41.5% at the university between 2014 and 2022. The racial identification of the survey respondents was 71.3 percent White, 18.1 percent Black, and 6.7 percent Latino. By comparison, the proportion of White undergraduate students ranged from 65.1% to 67.0%; Black undergraduate students ranged from 15.4% to 18.7%; and Latino undergraduate students ranged from 4.2% to 6.3% at the university between 2014 and 2022.

supported the use of military force to protect U.S. national security interests, and 54 percent of the respondents supported the use of military force to deal with humanitarian crises.

The foreign policy attitudes of the college students surveyed for this study were generally consistent with the foreign policy attitudes of the broader American public during this time period. Like most of the college students surveyed for this study, a majority of Americans tend to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs. The 2019 public opinion survey sponsored by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 70 percent of Americans supported an active U.S. role in world affairs.[10] A survey sponsored by the Pew Research Center in 2019 also found that a majority of Americans, albeit a somewhat lower percentage (53%), supported an active U.S. role in world affairs.[11] Furthermore, a majority of both the college students surveyed for this study and the American public generally support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs. In a survey sponsored by the Pew Research Center in 2020, some 74 percent of Americans, including 90 percent of Democrats and 53 percent of Republicans, supported the idea that countries should "act as part of a global community that works together to solve problems."[12] Lastly, a majority of both the college students surveyed for this study and the American public generally support the use of military force in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The 2019 National Defense Survey sponsored by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute found that 65 percent of Americans support maintaining U.S. military bases overseas and 76 percent of Americans support the use of U.S. military force to prevent human rights violations and to defend freedom in other countries.[13]

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[10] See Smeltz, Dina, et al. 2019. *Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support U.S. Engagement in Global Affairs - Results of the 2019 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy,* The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, Illinois, https://globalaffairs.org/.

[11] See Pew Research Center, *In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions,* December 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/.

[12] See Pew Research Center, *International Cooperation Welcomed Across 14 Advanced Economies,* September 2020, page 10, https://www.pewresearch.org/.

[13] Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation & Institute, *Results of the 2019 National Defense Survey,* November 2019, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/.

Table 1: Summary of College Student Attitudes Regarding US Foreign Policy

Variables	N	%
Dimensions of Foreign Policy Attitudes		
Support for internationalism	1,119	69.6
Support for multilateralism	1,154	71.8
Support for militarism	1,248	77.7
Support for militarism / security	1,012	62.9
Support for militarism / humanitarian	871	54.2
Perception of the Role of the United Nations		
UN plays an important role in the world	1,249	77.7
Other	358	22.3
Perception of the International Environment		
World is generally safe and friendly	519	32.3
Other	1,088	67.7
Primary source of News about International Affairs		
CNN News or MSNBC News	375	23.3
Fox News	311	19.4
Other	921	57.3
Amount of Exposure to International News		
One to three hours weekly	859	53.4
Three or more hours weekly	265	16.5
Other	483	30.1
International Travel		
Traveled abroad at least once	812	50.5
Other	795	49.5
Educational Level of Parent		
Both parents have at least a four-year college degree	607	37.8
Other	1,000	62.2
Total Number of Survey Respondents	1,607	100.0

Variables continued	n	%
Political Ideology		
Conservative	543	33.8
Liberal	590	36.7
Libertarian	113	7.0
Other	361	22.5
Political Party Identification		
Democratic Party	660	41.0
Republican Party	516	32.1
Libertarian Party	70	4.4
Other	361	22.5
Racial Identification		
White	1,146	71.3
Black	291	18.1
Latino	108	6.7
Other	62	3.9
Gender		
Male	684	42.6
Female	923	57.4
Religious Affiliation		
Evangelical Christian	599	37.3
Mainline Protestant	132	8.2
Roman Catholic	139	8.7
No Religious Affiliation	333	20.7
Other Religion	404	25.1
Total Number of Survey Respondents	1,607	100.0

Dependent Variables

       To account for each of the three main dimensions of U.S. foreign policy attitudes, three dependent variables are used in the statistical models estimated in this study: *Internationalism* – a model explaining support for active U.S. involvement in international affairs; *Multilateralism* – a model explaining support for multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs; and *Militarism* - a model explaining support for the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. Since individual attitudes regarding the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives might be conditioned on the general purpose of the use of military force, two additional models are estimated: *Militarism/Security* – a model explaining

support for the use of military force for protecting U.S national security interests; and *Militarism/Human* – a model explaining support for the use of military force to deal with humanitarian crises. For each of these five models, the dependent variable is coded "1" when the respondent indicates explicit support for the particular U.S. foreign policy approach, and the variable is coded "0" otherwise. The latter category includes responses that were not supportive of the particular approach or were unsure.

Independent Variables

Each of the main independent variables in this study, which are listed below, were operationalized as dichotomous (binary) variables.[14]

UN Role – coded "1" if the respondent believes that the United Nations plays an important role in the world and coded "0" otherwise.
World – coded "1" if the respondent believes that the world is generally a safe and friendly place and coded "0" otherwise.
CNN / MSNBC – coded "1" if the respondent's primary source of news about international affairs is CNN or MSNBC and coded "0" otherwise.
Fox News – coded "1" if the respondent's primary source of news about international affairs is Fox News and coded "0" otherwise.
News Exposure – coded "1" if the respondent spends three or more hours on average reading or listening to news about international affairs each week and coded "0" otherwise.
International Travel – coded "1" if the respondent has traveled outside of the U.S. and coded "0" otherwise.
Parents' Education – coded "1" if both of the respondent's parents have at least four-year college degrees (or at least one of the respondent's parents has a graduate or professional degree) and coded "0" otherwise.

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[14] We tested for multicollinearity among the main independent variables in the statistical models. The variance inflation factor (VIF), which indicates how much of the variance of a coefficient estimate is being inflated by multicollinearity, was between 1.01 and 1.14 for each of the independent variables in the study. The condition number was 6.3038. Generally, a VIF value less than five and a condition number less than ten indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem in the statistical models.

Control Variables

In each of the models, we controlled for alternative influences on foreign policy attitudes, including ideology (*Conservative, Liberal,* and *Libertarian*), race (*White, Black,* and *Latino*), sex, (*Male*), and religion (*Evangelical Christian, Mainline Protestant, Roman Catholic,* and *No Religion*).[15] Each of these control variables is coded "1" if the respondent identified with the factor and is coded "0" otherwise. The omitted categories in the dichotomous (binary) control variables are the responses corresponding to all of the other categories (including "other") in the survey questions. We also include the control variable *Partisan* in each of the models. This control variable is coded "1" when a respondent's political party affiliation aligned with the political party of the current president and is coded "0" otherwise.[16]

Results

Since each of the dependent variables in this study were operationalized as dichotomous (binary) variables, we estimated five different sets of logistic regression models with robust standard errors. The results of the logistic regression analyses of each of the dependent variables are presented in Tables 2 through 6. In each table, the three models correspond to analyses using the combined survey data from both periods (model 1), survey data from the period 2014-2017 (model 2), and survey data from the period 2019-2022 (model 3). Since logistic regression coefficients are difficult to interpret, we have included the odds ratio for the logit coefficients estimated in each of the models.

In Table 2, where the dependent variable in the models is *Internationalism*, there is support for four of the seven main hypotheses pertaining to college student attitudes regarding active U.S. involvement in international affairs. The logit coefficients for the independent variables *UN Role* and *World* are in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically

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[15] We did not include the respondent's political party affiliation (*Democratic, Republican,* and *Libertarian*) in the logistic regression models since these control variables were highly correlated with the ideology control variables (*Conservative, Liberal,* and *Libertarian*). We tested the models with the political party control variables instead of the ideology control variables, but this did not significantly change the results in any of the models.

[16] For the combined period, the political party affiliation of a total of 623 out of 1,607 college students (38.8%) aligned with the political party of the current president.

significant in all three models.[17] In addition, the logit coefficients for the independent variable *International Travel* are in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in models 1 and 2, and the logit coefficient for the independent variable *Fox News* is in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in models 1 and 3. As expected, college students who perceive that the UN plays an important role in the world, who perceive that the world is generally safe and friendly, who are exposed to three or more hours of international news each week, and whose primary source of international news is Fox News were more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs. The logit coefficients for the independent variable *Parents' Education* are statistically significant in models 1 and 3, but not in the predicted direction.

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[17] In model 1, the odds ratio (1.496) for the independent variable *UN Role* suggests that for students who perceive that the UN plays an important role in the world, the odds of supporting active U.S. involvement in international affairs are about 49 percent higher compared to students who do not perceive that the UN plays an important role in the world.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Analyses of College Student Attitudes Regarding Internationalism

Variables	(Combined)		(2014-2017)		(2019-2022)	
	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
UN Role	.401 (.134)***	1.493	.407 (.168)***	1.502	.440 (.225)**	1.553
World	.345 (.126)***	1.413	.310 (.164)**	1.364	.370 (.202)**	1.448
CNN / MSNBC	-.017 (.143)	.983	.130 (.178)	1.138	-.413 (.257)*	.662
Fox News	.207 (.160)*	1.230	.106 (.193)	1.112	.382 (.297)*	1.465
News Exposure	.198 (.158)	1.219	.263 (.209)	1.301	.111 (.248)	1.118
International Travel	.299 (.117)***	1.349	.341 (.153)**	1.406	.224 (.187)	1.252
Parents' Education	-.238 (.120)**	.788	-.194 (.156)	.824	-.307 (.191)*	.736
Conservative	.248 (.163)*	1.281	.221 (.201)	1.247	.370 (.298)	1.448
Liberal	.272 (.157)**	1.313	.158 (.205)	1.172	.522 (.268)**	1.685
Libertarian	-.178 (.233)	.837	-.127 (.312)	.881	-.081 (.372)	.922
Partisan	.278 (.125)**	1.321	.343 (.180)**	1.410	.305 (192)*	1.356
White	.515 (.208)***	1.674	.840 (.302)***	2.317	.063 (.313)	1.066
Black	-.238 (.231)	.788	-.121 (.316)	.886	-.368 (.365)	.692
Latino	.073 (.288)	1.076	.405 (.403)	1.499	-.396 (.457)	.673
Male	.156 (.117)*	1.169	.125 (.149)	1.133	.190 (.195)	1.210
Evangelical Christian	.270 (.147)**	1.310	.330 (.191)**	1.390	.239 (.236)	1.270
Mainline Protestant	.319 (.239)*	1.376	.343 (.301)	1.410	.260 (.406)	1.297
Roman Catholic	.493 (.245)**	1.638	.587 (.317)**	1.799	.387 (.409)	1.473
No Religion	-.117 (.165)	.890	-.085 (.217)	.918	-.160 (.264)	.852
Constant	-.493 (.268)		-.781 (.374)		-.284 (.422)	
N	1,607		993		614	
Log likelihood	-941.785		-569.750		-366.250	
Wald chi-squared	83.68		59.26		32.48	
Prob > chi-squared	0.0000		0.0000		0.0276	

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients estimated using STATA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed tests.

Table 3: Logistic Regression Analysis of College Student Attitudes Regarding Multilateralism

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	(Combined)		*(2014-2017)*		*(2019-2022)*	
	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
UN Role	.390 (.134)***	1.477	.271 (.176)*	1.312	.558 (.220)***	1.746
World	.294 (.131)**	1.342	.633 (.186)***	1.884	-.099 (.197)	.906
CNN / MSNBC	-.113 (.147)	.893	-.188 (.188)	.829	-.146 (.258)	.865
Fox News	-.306 (.154)**	.737	-.290 (.197)*	.748	-.485 (.273)**	.616
News Exposure	.711 (.186)***	2.036	1.057 (.287)***	2.876	.331 (.261)	1.392
International Travel	.203 (.122)**	1.226	-.079 (.168)	.924	.561 (.189)***	1.753
Parents' Education	.056 (.125)	1.057	.062 (.168)	1.064	.134 (.196)	1.143
Conservative	-.133 (.164)	.876	.061 (.200)	1.063	-.315 (.319)	.730
Liberal	.401 (.170)***	1.493	.482 (.232)**	1.619	.375 (.293)*	1.455
Libertarian	-.071 (.260)	.932	.227 (.384)	1.255	-.279 (.411)	.757
Partisan	-.121 (.130)	.886	.024 (195)	1.024	-.162 (.192)	.851
White	.749 (.215)***	2.114	.818 (.310)***	2.267	.295 (.317)	1.343
Black	.169 (.237)	1.184	.073 (.332)	1.076	-.156 (.374)	.855
Latino	.495 (.299)**	1.641	.528 (.412)*	1.696	.057 (.479)	1.058
Male	.334 (.122)***	1.396	.486 (.163)***	1.626	.161 (.198)	1.175
Evangelical Christian	-.170 (.147)	.844	-.481 (.194)***	.618	.263 (.237)	1.300
Mainline Protestant	-.130 (.229)	.878	-.422 (.290)*	.656	.107 (.401)	1.113
Roman Catholic	-.168 (.240)	.845	-.452 (.307)*	.636	.137 (.400)	1.147
No Religion	.356 (.194)**	1.428	.272 (.282)	1.313	.395 (.280)*	1.484
Constant	-.293 (.279)		.050 (.390)		-.299 (.430)	
N	1,607		993		614	
Log likelihood	-888.913		-507.862		-358.461	
Wald chi-squared	124.56		111.07		45.51	
Prob > chi-squared	0.0000		0.0000		0.0006	

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients estimated using STATA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed tests.

In Table 3, where the dependent variable in the models is *Multilateralism,* there is support for five of the seven main hypotheses pertaining to student attitudes regarding multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs. The logit coefficients for the independent variables *UN*

Role and *Fox News* are in their predicted directions and statistically significant in all three models. In addition, the logit coefficients for the independent variable *International Travel* are in their predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in models 1 and 3. Lastly, the logit coefficients for the independent variables *World* and *News Exposure* are in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in models 1 and 2. As expected, college students who perceive that the UN plays an important

role in the world, who are exposed to three or more hours of international news each week, who have traveled overseas, and who perceive the world as generally safe and friendly were more likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs. Also consistent with our expectations, we found that college students whose primary source of international news is Fox News were less likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs.[18]

In Table 4, where the dependent variable in the models is *Militarism,* there is support for two of the seven main hypotheses pertaining to college student attitudes regarding the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The logit coefficients for the independent variable *World* are in the predicted direction (negative) and statistically significant in models 1 and 3, and the logit coefficients for the independent variable *Fox News* are in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in all three models. As expected, college students who perceive the world as generally safe and friendly were less likely to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives, while college students whose primary source of international news is Fox News were more likely to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. The logit coefficients for the independent variable *International Travel* are statistically significant, but not in the predicted direction, in all three models.

The results shown in the models in Table 4 may reflect the possibility that some college students only support the use of military force for national security reasons or for humanitarian reasons, but not necessarily for both reasons. If that is true for at least some of the college students surveyed for this study, the statistical impact of the independent variables on attitudes regarding the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy

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[18] In model 1, the odds ratio (.737) for the independent variable *Fox News* suggests that for students whose primary source of international news is Fox News, the odds of supporting multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs are about 27 percent lower compared to students whose primary source of international news is not Fox News.

Table 4. Logistic Regression Analyses of College Student Attitudes regarding Militarism

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	(Combined)		*(2014-2017)*		*(2019-2022)*	
	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
UN Role	.188 (.161)	1.207	.252 (.208)	1.287	.168 (.263)	1.183
World	-.235 (.137)**	.790	-.006 (.188)	.994	-.483 (.211)**	.617
CNN / MSNBC	.201 (.170)	1.222	.227 (.218)	1.254	.086 (.289)	1.090
Fox News	.733 (.209)***	2.082	.360 (.258)*	1.433	1.273 (.403)***	3.571
News Exposure	.001 (.172)	1.001	-.059 (.232)	.943	-.066 (.264)	.937
International Travel	.311 (.135)**	1.365	.286 (.188)*	1.331	.298 (.201)*	1.347
Parents' Education	.034 (.138)	1.035	.020 (.197)	1.020	.114 (.204)	1.121
Conservative	.733 (.202)***	2.081	1.181 (.277)***	3.358	.242 (.354)	1.273
Liberal	-.479 (.164)***	.619	-.232 (.213)	.793	-.698 (.292)***	.498
Libertarian	.029 (.270)	1.029	.271 (.371)	1.312	-.371 (.439)	.690
Partisan	.335 (140)***	1.398	.262 (203)*	1.299	.387 (.202)**	1.473
White	.621 (.231)***	1.860	.656 (.329)**	1.928	.481 (.349)*	1.618
Black	-.066 (.261)	.936	-.134 (.358)	.875	-.156 (.412)	.856
Latino	.521 (.327)*	1.683	.004 (.385)	1.004	1.119 (.568)**	3.061
Male	.178 (.133)*	1.195	.074 (.175)	1.077	.419 (.214)**	1.521
Evangelical Christian	-.024 (.172)	.977	.249 (.230)	1.283	-.310 (.270)	.734
Mainline Protestant	.121 (.289)	1.129	.266 (.396)	1.304	-.049 (.451)	.952
Roman Catholic	.217 (.292)	1.242	.208 (.363)	1.231	.145 (.502)	1.156
No Religion	-.679 (.179)***	.507	-.668 (.242)***	.513	-.805 (.283)***	.447
Constant	.397 (.304)		.320 (.423)		.586 (.483)	
N	1,607		993		614	
Log likelihood	-764.918		-427.104		-321.429	
Wald chi-squared	158.86		84.65		75.17	
Prob > chi-squared	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients estimated using STATA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed tests

objectives may not be apparent in the models shown in Table 4. The impact may, however, be apparent in the models discussed below in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5. Logistic Regression Analyses of College Student Attitudes regarding Militarism / Security

Variables	Model 1 (Combined)		Model 2 (2014-2017)		Model 3 (2019-2022)	
	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
UN Role	.262 (.140)**	1.299	.429 (.178)***	1.536	.084 (.232)	1.087
World	-.208 (.120)**	.812	-.177 (.160)	.838	-.225 (.195)	.798
CNN / MSNBC	.296 (.149)**	1.345	.276 (.182)*	1.318	.138 (.271)	1.148
Fox News	.533 (.167)***	1.704	.336 (.202)**	1.399	.738 (.297)***	2.092
News Exposure	.231 (.153)*	1.260	.153 (.204)	1.165	.279 (.243)	1.322
International Travel	.096 (.116)	1.101	.054 (.155)	1.055	.087 (.182)	1.091
Parents' Education	-.157 (.119)*	.855	-.173 (.160)	.841	-.066 (.185)	.936
Conservative	.521 (.168)***	1.683	.649 (.211)***	1.915	.500 (.306)*	1.648
Liberal	-.747 (.150)***	.474	-.442 (.193)**	.643	-.883 (.268)***	.413
Libertarian	-.219 (.231)	.803	-.096 (.309)	.908	-.291 (.379)	.748
Partisan	.058 (.120)	1.059	-.144 (.168)	.865	.175 (.186)	1.191
White	.454 (.213)**	1.575	.421 (.286)*	1.523	.339 (.330)	1.404
Black	-.037 (.243)	.964	-.089 (.318)	.915	-.124 (.392)	.883
Latino	.227 (.280)	1.255	-.106 (.345)	.899	.597 (.483)	1.817
Male	.167 (.116)*	1.181	.108 (.151)	1.114	.286 (.191)*	1.331
Evangelical Christian	.281 (.146)**	1.325	.574 (.195)***	1.776	-.053 (.228)	.949
Mainline Protestant	.293 (.227)*	1.340	.544 (.307)**	1.723	-.091 (.378)	.913
Roman Catholic	.184 (.231)	1.202	.360 (.290)	1.433	-.116 (.398)	.890
No Religion	-.428 (.162)***	.652	-.475 (.210)**	.622	-.408 (.266)*	.665
Constant	-.089 (.277)		-.056 (.371)		-.079 (.438)	
N	1,607		993		614	
Log likelihood	-952.035		-557.228		-375.468	
Wald chi-squared	184.66		98.30		87.26	
Prob > chi-squared	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients estimated using STATA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed tests.

In Table 5, the dependent variable in the models is *Militarism/Security.* This dependent variable measures support for the use of military force to protect vital U.S. national security interests, including supporting U.S. allies against foreign aggression and opposing security

threats to the U.S. The logit coefficients for the independent variables *World* and *Parents' Education* are in the predicted direction (negative) in all three models, but only statistically significant in model 1. These results indicate that college students who perceive the world as generally safe and friendly and whose parents had at least four-year college degrees were generally less supportive of the use of military force to protect vital U.S. national security interests. The logit coefficients for the independent variable *Fox News* are in the predicted direction (positive) and statistically significant in all three models. These results indicate that college students whose primary source of international news is Fox News were more supportive of the use of military force to protect vital U.S. national security interests. The logit coefficients for *UN Role* and *CNN/MSNBC* were positive and statistically significant in models 1 and 2.

Finally, *Militarism/Humanitarian* is the dependent variable in the models in Table 6. This dependent variable measures support for the use of military force to deal with humanitarian crises, including stopping or preventing genocide and assisting civilians adversely affected by civil war. The logit coefficients for the independent variable *International Travel* are positive and statistically significant in models 1 and 3, while the logit coefficient for the independent variable *Parents' Education* is positive and statistically significant in model 2. In addition, the logit coefficient for the independent variable *CNN/MSNBC* is positive and statistically significant in model 2. The results provide some evidence that college students who have traveled overseas, whose parents have at least four-year college degrees, and whose primary source of international news was CNN or MSNBC were significantly more likely to support the use of military force to deal with humanitarian crises.

Robustness Checks

In order to check the robustness of the results of the original logistic regression models, we ran additional tests and estimated additional regression models to address two potential issues. First, we assume that the three main dependent variables in this study (*Internationalism, Multilateralism,* and *Militarism*) are correlated since they are three dimensions of foreign policy attitudes. If an individual's foreign policy attitudes are coherent and structured, then it makes sense that the dimensions are correlated in some manner. Using bivariate probit regression, two correlated dependent variables can be simultaneously estimated using the same set of

Table 6. Logistic Regression Analyses of College Student Attitudes regarding Militarism / Humanitarian

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	(Combined)		*(2014-2017)*		*(2019-2022)*	
	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	Odds Ratio
UN Role	-.022 (.125)	.979	.050 (.155)	1.051	-.355 (.222)	.873
World	-.005 (.113)	.995	.011 (.146)	1.011	-.039 (.186)	.962
CNN / MSNBC	.149 (.133)	1.161	.226 (.163)*	1.253	.010 (.259)	1.010
Fox News	.096 (.144)	1.100	-.077 (.176)	.926	.399 (.266)*	1.490
News Exposure	.074 (.141)	1.077	.052 (.179)	1.054	.113 (.231)	1.119
International Travel	.273 (.107)***	1.314	.063 (.140)	1.065	.572 (.175)***	1.772
Parents' Education	.042 (.109)	1.043	.209 (.142)*	1.233	-.131 (.178)	.877
Conservative	.194 (.148)*	1.214	.296 (.177)**	1.345	.040 (.287)	1.041
Liberal	-.151 (.144)	.860	-.032 (.184)	.917	-.272 (.251)	.762
Libertarian	.008 (.224)	1.008	.207 (.295)	1.230	-.388 (.381)	.679
Partisan	.363 (112)***	1.438	.380 (158)***	1.463	.326 (.180)**	1.386
White	.362 (.195)**	1.436	.430 (.261)**	1.537	.233 (.299)	1.262
Black	-.294 (.219)	.745	-.335 (.285)	.716	-.362 (.354)	.697
Latino	.068 (.264)	1.071	-.410 (.325)	.664	.800 (.454)**	2.226
Male	-.010 (.107)	.990	-.172 (.135)	.842	.296 (.185)*	1.345
Evangelical Christian	-.181 (.134)*	.835	-.137 (.171)	.872	-.246 (.224)	.782
Mainline Protestant	-.123 (.212)	.884	-.129 (.258)	.879	-.013 (.393)	.987
Roman Catholic	.125 (.212)	1.133	.135 (.267)	1.145	.029 (.365)	1.029
No Religion	-.349 (.157)**	.706	-.217 (.203)	.805	-.641 (.258)***	.527
Constant	-.245 (.255)		-.249 (.335)		-.198 (.416)	
N	1,607		993		614	
Log likelihood	-1076.995		-660.602		-399.266	
Wald chi-squared	60.39		39.05		45.91	
Prob > chi-squared	0.0000		0.0043		0.0005	

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients estimated using STATA. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The odds ratios are the exponentiated coefficients. Significance levels: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed tests.

independent variables. These results can be compared with the results of the original logistic regression models.

Since there are three main dependent variables in this study, we ran three different bivariate probit regression models using the three pairs of dependent variables (*Militarism-Internationalism, Militarism-Multilateralism,* and *Internationalism-Multilateralism*). A bivariate probit regression model generates a correlation coefficient (*rho*) pertaining to the disturbances (errors terms) of the simultaneously estimated probit models. If the correlation coefficient (*rho*) is statistically significantly different from zero, then we can confirm that the dependent variables in the simultaneously estimated model are correlated. The models, which are provided in Table 7 in Appendix B, indicate correlation between the pairs of dependent variables. The results are generally consistent with the results of the original logistic regression models. All of the independent variables with statistically significant coefficients in the predicted directions in the original logistic regression models were also statistically significant in the predicted directions in the bivariate probit regression models. Unlike the original logistic regression models, the coefficients for *News Exposure* were statistically significant in the predicted direction in the bivariate regression models that included *Internationalism* as one of the two dependent variables (models 1 and 3).

A second issue impacting the robustness of the original logistic regression models is the possibility that the two perceptual independent variables (*UN Role* and *World*) and the *Fox News* independent variable may not be entirely exogenous or, in other words, may not actually be independent. More specifically, the variables may be partially influenced by the dependent variables in the models. This issue is known as simultaneity bias. For example, a college student's foreign policy attitudes regarding the use of U.S. military force may be influenced by the student's reliance on Fox News as their primary source of news regarding international affairs. At the same time, the student's reliance on Fox News as their primary source of news regarding international affairs may be influenced by their attitudes regarding the use of U.S. military force. Similarly, a college's students foreign policy attitudes regarding active U.S. involvement in international affairs may be influenced the student's perception of the importance of the UN. At the same time, the student's perception of the importance of the UN may be influence by their foreign policy attitudes regarding active U.S. involvement in international affairs. In both examples, the "causal arrows" may go in both directions.

Since endogenous independent variables may lead to biased and inconsistent regression coefficients, we need to test for endogeneity. Since the dependent variables and the potentially endogenous independent

variables are dichotomous (binary) variables, we estimated a series of seemingly unrelated bivariate probit (SUBP) regression models. In these models, a suspected endogenous independent variable is treated as a dependent variable in the first of two simultaneously estimated probit models (first stage). In the second of the two simultaneously estimated probit models (second stage), the suspected endogenous variable is included as an independent variable in the equation with the main dependent variable. We found evidence that the suspected independent variables were endogenous in nearly half of the SUBP regression models. Notably, all three of the suspected variables were found to be endogenous in the models with *Militarism* and *Militarism/Security* as the dependent variables. The results of the SUBP regression models are provided in Tables 8 through 10 in Appendix B. Correcting for endogeneity in the models in which the correlation coefficient *rho* is statistically significant, the results (second stage) are mostly consistent with the results of the original logistic regression models.[19]

Discussion

This study examined the foreign policy attitudes of members of the "9/11 generation" who were born just prior to or after the September 11th terrorist attacks. More than 1,600 college students at a university in the U.S. South were surveyed regarding their attitudes regarding foreign policy and international affairs between 2014 and 2022. Several perceptual and informational factors were hypothesized to influence three dimensions of the foreign policy attitudes of the college students, including internationalism, multilateralism, and militarism. The results of logistic regression models, along with the results of bivariate regression models to check the robustness of the logistic regression models, provided empirical support for most of the hypotheses in this study pertaining to the foreign policy attitudes of college students.

College students who perceived that the UN plays an important global role were more likely to support active and multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs. Contrary to our expectation, college students who perceived that the UN plays an important global role were also more likely to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. Consistent with our expectations, we found that college students

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[19] The correlation coefficient (*rho*) is statistically significant in models 3 and 4 in Table 8; models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 9; and models 3 and 4 in Table 10.

who generally perceive the international environment as friendly or non-threatening were also more likely to support active and multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs and less likely to support the use of military force.

Regarding the importance of a college student's primary source of news about international affairs, we found that media had a minimal impact on the foreign policy attitudes of college students whose primary source of news about international affairs were the left-leaning CNN or MSNBC. What little impact we did find for CNN/MSNBC was not in the expected direction concerning foreign policy attitudes on the use of military force. On the other hand, we found that media had a considerable impact on the foreign policy attitudes of college students whose primary source of news about international affairs was the right-leaning Fox News. As expected, these students were more likely to support active U.S. involvement in international affairs, less likely to support multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and more likely to support the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. These findings suggest that Fox News may be more effective than both CNN and MSNBC in terms of influencing the foreign policy attitudes of their respective audiences.

We also found support in this study for the hypotheses that college students who spent three or more hours on average per week consuming news about international affairs and who had previously travelled outside of the U.S. were more likely to support active and multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs. The expectation that such college students would also oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives was not supported empirically by the statistical analyses in this study. There was no support for the hypothesis that college students whose parents were more educated would support active and multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs or oppose the use of military force to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Overall, the findings in this study enhance our basic understanding of the foreign policy attitudes of members of the "9/11 Generation" who entered colleges and universities in the past decade. Similar to other Americans, a majority of the college students surveyed for this study were generally supportive of active U.S. involvement in international affairs, multilateral U.S. involvement in international affairs, and the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives. The results of the statistical analyses supported the argument that certain perceptual and information

factors impact the foreign policy attitudes of college students. While the results of this study provided evidence of the impact of cable news networks, particularly Fox News, on college student attitudes regarding foreign policy, future research on this topic might focus more on social media and other alternative (non-traditional) sources of information on which college students may be increasingly relying.

Although the sample of college students surveyed for this study came from one public, four-year university in the U.S. South, there is at least one general implication for U.S. foreign policymakers. The results provide evidence that, similar to previous generations of Americans, many members of the "9/11 Generation" hold coherent and structured attitudes about U.S. foreign policy and international affairs. If so, U.S. government officials making decisions about foreign policy in the future will need to pay close attention to the attitudes of this generation as they have done with previous generations of Americans.

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The Second Time's the Charm: How U.S. House Members Recover Their Electoral Standing Two Years After the Initial Post-Redistricting Election

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The ability of U.S. House members to recover from the initial loss of the "personal vote" among new constituents added to their districts by redistricting has been well documented in the literature. But the reasons for this recovery two years later, which may thwart the designs of gerrymandering carried out against the opposition party, are not well understood. In this study of the 2012 round of redistricting and its aftermath, we find that constituent cognitions of the incumbent in 2014 related to contact, overall approval, and ideological distance are as favorable among those redistricted two years earlier as they are among the non-redistricted. So, none of these cognitions impairs reelection safety in 2014. Three other cognitions - - awareness of special projects by the member, evaluations of representational quality, and knowledge of the member - - - are less incumbent-friendly in 2014 among the redistricted than the non-redistricted. But among these three, however, only representational quality affects voting that year, and the magnitude of the damage is modest. There further is tentative evidence that reduction in the magnitude of the ideological distance variable - - the sole variable for which both 2012 and 2014 data exist - - is at least a part of the reason redistricted constituents return to pro-incumbent voting two years after the boundary shifts. Thus, a plausible explanation emerges for the restoration of members' safety two years after the initial post-redistricting election, which centers on their own ability to steer constituents' cognitions in their direction.

Students of congressional redistricting have been sensitive to the risks to members' electoral security posed by the initial post-redistricting election (Murphy and Yoshinaka 2009, 965-66; Herrnson, Panagopoulos, and Bailey 2020, 25). Regardless of how a district may have been transformed in partisanship, the addition of transplanted constituents in and of itself means new voters lacking attraction to the incumbent on the

basis of the "personal vote"; i.e., the residuum of goodwill developed by constituents over time as a result of member casework, pork barreling, and name recognition (Seabrook 2017, 19-20). Essentially, transplanted constituents are akin to non-redistricted constituents facing an open seat election, where neither candidate possesses the electoral advantages of incumbency (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000, 26; Hood and McKee 2008, 63; McKee 2008a, 124; Hayes and McKee 2009, 1010-11; Hood and McKee 2010, 345; Bullock 2021, 147). Thus, members, in general, prefer minimal changes to their existing district lines (Cain 1984, 116).

One full term after redistricting, however, a number of studies have found that margins rebound in the appended areas as constituents' familiarity with their new incumbent grows, albeit not quite to the safety levels existing in areas maintaining the same representative (Rush 1992, 106-11; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000, 27-28; Rush 2000, 257; Desposato and Petrocik 2003, 25-26; Desposato and Petrocik 2005, 55).[1] A case in point is Texas Republican Pete Sessions, whose two-party reelection margin in 2012 slumped to 59.6 percent after new district lines retained only 34 percent of his previous constituents.[2] This was despite a 2.2 percent increase in GOP partisanship (measured in terms of the difference between his old district's actual 2008 vote for John McCain and the McCain vote recomputed within the new district boundaries). 2014, however, saw Sessions' vote rebound to 63.6 percent, slightly below the 64.2 percent margin of 2010.

Further reduction in the incumbent safety differential between old and new areas then occurs over subsequent terms at a diminished pace (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2000, 28-29). Thus, a straightforward explanation exists for the observed trend of aggregate incumbency safety gradually rising from the first to the last election year that redistricting plans are in effect. This is different than explanations for the trend that emphasize the behavior of opposition party elites, such as speculation that the non-incumbent party learns through trial and error over the course of a decade not to expend substantial campaign

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[1] An exception exists for southern Democratic members in 1994, however, who actually did worse than they did among new constituents two years earlier because of the strong pro-Republican realigning trend in the latter year. See Petrocik and Deposato (1998, 629).

[2] Data for determining what percentages of a new district are comprised of old and new constituents may be accessed from the Missouri Census Data Center's Geographic Correspondence Engine.

resources in districts that proved impervious to their early efforts (Jacobson 2006, 30-31), or speculation that viable challengers are more likely to emerge earlier in the redistricting cycle when, were they victorious, uncertainty about how future redrawing might impair their own reelection fortunes would be a longer term and hence less pressing concern (Cox and Katz 2002, 162-71; Hetherington, Larson, and Globetti 2003, 1223-27; Cox 2005, 27).[3]

Incumbents themselves, therefore, seem to possess agency in being able to rebound from initial redistricting damage, which may frustrate the long-term plans of the opposition party to capture their seat. We know little, however, about the important specific question of just <u>how</u> the rebounding in members' electoral support among new constituents is generated. It certainly seems possible that over the two-year period following the immediate post-redistricting election, different kinds of electorally relevant incumbent assessments by newcomers will evolve at different rates toward the levels of those held by retained constituents. The simplest such factor, of course, might be greater name recognition arising over the course of one term's experience with the new representative.

On the other hand, perhaps of greater importance is what happens to the <u>content</u> of such recognition rather than recognition by itself. Two years' time, for example, affords opportunity for the incumbent to convince newcomers of alignment between his or her ideological positioning and their own. Boatright (2004, 441) and Crespin (2010, 854-55) find that reelected incumbents modify their roll call voting from the term just before redistricting to the term immediately afterward, presumably in accordance with changes in district demography. In more expansive research, Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin find changes in roll call voting within specific issue domains to be direct responses to related demographic changes caused by redistricting, e.g., greater support for positions espoused by the Alliance for Retired Americans when the district's percentage of senior citizens is increased

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[3] Hetherington, Larson, and Globetti, (2003, 1223, 1228-31) also find that adverse national economic conditions have the strongest effect in inducing quality challengers of the non-presidential party to run in the first post-redistricting election when uncertainty about the incumbent's electoral standing is at its peak. The incumbent's prior margin, however, affects whether a quality challenger runs to a greater extent later in the redistricting cycle, when the incumbent's electoral situation has become more established.

(2010, 103-04). Even stronger responses to demographic change are generated in the form of bill sponsorships or co-sponsorships within relevant issue areas (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010, 100-03). Improvement in the content of incumbent assessment could also arise with regard to cognitions derived from relatively policy-thin interactions, such as visitations, townhall forums within the appended territory, and email communications. Evidence exists of members establishing unofficial district offices within the new areas even before the initial post-redistricting election takes place (Boatright 2004, 447-50; McKee 2008b, 973), and it seems likely that further concentration on these areas would continue afterward as well. There further is the possibility through such subsequent interaction to inform new constituents about both pre- and post-redistricting federal project money brought into the district, even though the former service may not be particularly relevant to those who were not constituents at the time.

    In contrast, it may be more difficult for the member over a two-year period to strengthen newcomers' perceptions of how well he or she represents the district. At the core of the representational relationship is constituent trust in the member, and trust takes considerable time to develop. In the words of Fenno:

> Trust is, however, a fragile relationship. It is not an overnight or a one-time thing. It is hard to win, and it must be constantly renewed and rewon. . . . So, it takes an enormous amount of time to build and to maintain constituent trust (1978, 56). [4]

Overall approval of the member, however, may be quicker to grow than favorable appraisals of representational quality, as a consequence of its shorter-term components. Favorable approval, for example, could emerge from first-termer activities noted above, such as sponsorship or co-sponsorship of popular legislation, even if attempts to establish lasting representational relationships with the constituency over this time span had only marginal payoff.

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[4] For a reiteration of the theme that representational relationships between members and constituents may be slow to evolve, see Jacobson and Carson 2020, 140).

We thus hypothesize on the basis of this literature review that convergence with regard to the foregoing factors will, in general, be evident between new and old constituents two years after redistricting. The two possible exceptions to the hypothesis involve representation, where convergence may well take more than two years to develop, and awareness of federal project money obtained by the member, where old constituents would have experienced a longer period of time over which such monies were delivered.

Of course, discovering convergence between various member cognitions held by continuing and new constituents one term past redistricting would in itself be insufficient grounds for explaining the improvement in members' electoral performance. Evidence must be found as well that the cognitions in question actually made a difference in voting behavior.

Ideally, panel data across a long-term series of elections would be available to track the trajectory by which redistricted and retained constituents converge in their incumbent cognitions and voting behavior over time. No existing survey dataset, however, includes re-interviews with respondents that extend more than a single election past the year when the new district lines went into effect. Being constrained to focus on this second election alone should not pose a problem, though, since the greatest improvement in the member's electoral standing, as pointed out above, occurs over the initial two-year period.

Data and Methods

The data to be analyzed come from the 2010-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Panel Survey.[5] Aside from the wealth of questions in the questionnaire specifically directed at U.S. House elections, the parts of the study applicable to our research purposes have the virtue of substantial sample size: 9500 total respondents interviewed online by YouGov before and after both the 2012 and 2014 national elections. While respondents are not directly coded in the CCES to indicate whether they were shifted into a new district by 2012 redistricting, it is possible to identify such transplanted respondents indirectly by making use of a variable that only codes respondents' perceptions of member ideology in cases where the

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[5] As of 2020, the name of these studies has been shortened simply to the "Cooperative Election Study" (CES).

preexisting incumbent (i.e., the incumbent elected in the 2010 election) is absent from their 2012 ballot.[6] After eliminating cases where this absence results from incumbent retirement or renomination defeat, the remaining respondents therefore are those who have been redistricted into a new district with a different incumbent running.

For the most part, we shall focus on differences in 2014 between constituents who were or were not redistricted into new districts two years earlier. Wherever possible, however, differences between the two kinds of constituents will be analyzed in 2012 as well, at the very start of the new redistricting cycle. But while this can obviously be done with regard to the incidence of pro-incumbent voting in 2012, it cannot be done with regard to most of the cognitions concerning the incumbent we are interested in; i.e., for transplanted constituents the relevant 2012 CCES questions in all but one case were directed at preexisting members rather than new members appearing on the ballot. The exception is perceived placement of incumbent ideology, which we use to construct respondent ideological distance from the incumbent. Here in the 2012 survey, respondents were asked for placements of both candidates on the ballot, one of whom (except in the case of open seat districts) was the incumbent running for reelection, whether new to the respondent or the respondent's preexisting member.[7]

The term "cognition" is used in this study in a broad sense to refer to six specific evaluations of, knowledge of, or recalled interactions with the member. They are as follows:

Contact (1 if constituent has had any contact with the member over the past two years in the form of visiting or calling the member's office, sending to or receiving from the member a letter or email, receiving a phone call from the member, meeting the member at a public event, or experiencing some other form of contact; 0 otherwise)

Project (1 if constituent is aware of any special project brought into his or her area by the member; 0 otherwise)

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[6] The relevant variable is CC12_341M.

[7] Placements of the Democratic and Republican candidates are coded in CC12_341K and CC12_341L, respectively.

Represent (3 if member is thought to represent district very well, 2 if somewhat well, 1 if not well)

Approve (4 if constituent strongly approves of member, 3 if approves, 2 if disapproves, 1 if strongly disapproves)

Knowledge (1 if constituent claims to have heard of member and to know his or her party affiliation; 0 if never heard of member)

Ideological distance (absolute value of difference between self-placement of constituent on seven-point ideological scale and placement of member).[8]

These cognitions, which have been used as standard independent variables in past studies of congressional voting behavior, all relate to the three forms of electorally useful activities outlined by Mayhew in his classic work, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (1974, 49-73). "Advertising," intended to enhance awareness of the incumbent in a largely issue-less context (e.g., name recognition), should most directly affect placement on the Knowledge cognition. "Credit claiming," through which members publicize providing material benefits to constituents (e.g., pork barrelling), can be expected to have the greatest impact on Project. Finally, "Position taking," which involves staking out judgmental stances on items of interest to constituents (e.g., roll call votes), should be most relevant to Ideological distance. Above and beyond this, all three of Mayhew's activities presumably relate to the more general Represent and Approve cognitions, while more opportunity for members to communicate word about the activities would be available when constituents have positive scores on Contact.

All investigations will be carried out with multilevel analysis, in which individual respondents are nested within the congressional districts that were created in 2012. Fixed effects for the intercept and slope coefficients are computed at the individual level (i.e., these are the independent variable effects on individual respondents). Random effects variances are computed at the district level (i.e., these are the variances of the intercepts across districts). Simply including at a single

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[8] Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2022, 130-36) present evidence that constituents' perceptions of how their Congress member voted on important roll call votes correspond well to the actual votes that were cast. They also determine that perceived agreement with roll call votes strongly affects approval of the member and election support.

level all variables, regardless of whether they apply to individual respondents or to House districts, would bias downward the standard errors of the parameters, owing to non-independence among each district's respondents (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220; Bickel 2007, 9-12).[9] Only respondents casting U.S. House votes in districts where an incumbent faces off against a major party challenger will be considered. Furthermore, respondents in races involving two incumbents thrown together by redistricting are excluded from the 2012 analyses.[10]

The Effects of Redistricting on Voting and on Incumbent Cognitions

We start straightforwardly with an examination of pro-incumbent voting by redistricted and retained constituents in the 2012 and 2014 House elections. The findings mentioned above that redistricting's impairment of pro-incumbent voting ebbs over the two-year period following the immediate post-redistricting election have been based upon data from earlier election years, and we first wish to ascertain whether this phenomenon is replicated for the more recent such election year pair. The 2012 and 2014 equations, which are the basic starting points for the analysis, exclude cognition variables. Later, these cognitions, which, of course, are more abundant in the latter election year, will be added to the equations. The respondents analyzed in 2014 exclude those whose incumbent is a first termer, since non-redistricted constituents with first-term members are identical to redistricted constituents in the sense of having had their member for only two years. In both election years as well constituents who resided at their current address for two years or less are excluded, because those who had moved from another district might for this reason alone know little about their new incumbent regardless of whether they had been redistricted.

Table 1 contains the results of the multilevel logit analyses, in which 1 on the dependent variable represents a vote for the incumbent and 0 a vote for the challenger. The independent variables are:

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[9] Estimation of differences between redistricted and non-redistricted constituents is performed with Stata's meglm, melogit, or meologit set of routines, depending upon whether the cognition being analyzed is continuous, dichotomous, or ordinal, respectively.
[10] Additional grounds for exclusion include residency in a Louisiana district where there was two-party competition, but multiple candidates from either party on the ballot. This is possible under the state's "jungle" election law; if no candidate receives a majority of the November vote, the top two finishers irrespective of party compete in a subsequent December run-off.

Redistricted (1 if respondent was redistricted into new incumbent's district in 2012, 0 if not redistricted)

Sameparty (1 if respondent identifies strongly or not very strongly with incumbent's party, or leans that way; 0 if independent; -1 if identifies strongly or not very strongly with challenger's party, or leans that way)[11]

Incumbent's party (1 if member is Republican, 0 if Democrat)

Age (age of the respondent in years)

Interest (4 if respondent follows what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, 3 if some of the time, 2 if only now and then, 1 if hardly at all)

Political activity (1 if respondent engaged in at least one political activity over past year, 0 if no political activity)

Economy (for respondents with Democratic incumbent, 5 if nation's economy seen as having gotten much better over past year, 4 if better, 3 if about the same or not sure, 2 if worse, 1 if much worse; for respondents with Republican incumbent, codes are in reverse order)

Coattails (only used in 2012 analysis) (for respondents with Democratic incumbent, 1 if 2012 presidential vote is for Barack Obama, 0 if for Mitt Romney; for respondents with Republican incumbent, codes are in reverse order).

The need for SameParty and Incumbent's Party as control variables is obvious. (No direction of the relationship is hypothesized for the latter variable.) Older constituents are expected to favor the incumbent more as a result of a political decision-making process reliant upon more circumscribed information about candidates. Thus, there should be a falling back upon a handful of highly salient, easily accessible cues, such as party, general ideology, or, in our case, incumbency (Lau and Redlawsk 2008, 169, 173). Interest and Political activity are included as indices of constituent political engagement, but the direction of the

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[11] Independent leaners are grouped together with party identifiers, given the tendency of leaners and weak partisans to support candidates of their favored party at about the same rate. See Jacobson and Carson (2020, 166-67).

relationship is not clear. On one hand, more engaged voters would better be able to identify which candidate on the ballot was the incumbent, who, in contrast to the challenger, would become more likely to possess through previous experience the ability to confer upon the district material benefits like project money and casework services. But on the negative side of the ledger, greater political engagement can mean heightened awareness of factors detrimental to the incumbent, such as unpopular positions taken on roll call votes or the perception that the distance of the incumbent's ideological position from the respondents exceeds that of the challenger. Finally, two variables that strongly contribute to the nationalization of the House vote across districts are included. Economy registers the effect of perceptions of change in the national economy over the past year, and Coattails (only in 2012) accounts for the partisan effect of presidential election choice. Given the coding scheme for these two variables, both will have a positive impact on incumbent voting.

The significant negatively signed parameter for Redistricted in the first column of Table 1, of course, indicates that constituents who have been thrown into a new incumbent's district by redistricting have smaller odds of voting for that incumbent in 2012 than constituents retaining the same member.

Table 1: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of 2012 Redistricting on Voting for House Incumbent in 2012 and 2014

Fixed Effects of Independent Variables	2012	2012	2014
Redistricted	.533**	-.455**	-.264
	(.202)	(.194)	(.387)
Sameparty	1.864***	2.867***	3.389***
	(.140)	.121)	(.191)
Incumbent's party	-.022	-.192	.551*
	(.203)	(.190)	(.286)
Age	.017**	.019**	041**
	(.006)	(.006	(.015)
Interest	-.149	-.164	-.449**
	(.151)	(.135)	(.172)
Political activity	-.09	-.282	-.201
	(.249)	(.213)	(.265)
Economy	421***	1.149***	.906***
	(.109)	(.102)	(.179)
Coattails	3.652***	- - -	- - -
	(.278)		
Constant	-2.629***	-2.977***	-2.992**
	(.624)	(.596)	(1.027)
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts			
House District Level	1.320***	1.243***	1.940***
	(.254)	(.234)	(.407)
Log-likelihood	-901.253	-1113.817	-593.128
N of Respondents	6362	6533	3693
N of House Districts	337	337	261

Note: Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. One-tail tests were used to determine significance for Redistricted, Sameparty, Age, Economy, and Coattails; two-tail tests used for Incumbent's party, Interest, and Political activity.
 ***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

More specifically, the expected proportions of redrawn and continuing constituents backing the incumbent can be calculated by maintaining each respondent's actual values on all independent variables except Redistricted, where values of 1 and 0, respectively, are substituted for all respondents (population average impacts have been generated with regard to the prior distribution of the random effects).[12] Redrawn constituents are then estimated to have .599 odds of pro-incumbent voting, versus .621 odds for retained constituents. To enhance the comparability of the analyses across the two election years, column two repeats the 2012 analysis, now, however, removing Coattails so that the exact same independent variables appear in both 2012 and 2014. Here, Redistricted continues to be significant, and the procedure for estimating the impact of redistricting for redrawn and retained constituents yields .595 and .619 odds, respectively, of pro-incumbent voting, a slightly bigger impact than before. In contrast, the considerably insignificant Redistricted parameter in the third column shows that having been redistricted no longer weakens voting for the incumbent in 2014. Estimated odds of backing the incumbent at Redistricted values of 1 and 0 are .603 and .616, respectively, meaning a smaller, albeit not negligible, impact of redistricting in 2014 compared to 2012. But the inability to statistically distinguish the 2014 coefficient from 0 makes inferring an effect of any magnitude hazardous. Despite the growth of party-based voting over recent decades, therefore, the loss of an incumbent's personal vote among constituents newly added to a district still matters initially, as does the restoration of a major part of the personal vote after these constituents have spent two years being represented by this member.

Also of relevance in Table 1 is that Republican incumbents are advantaged in 2014. Older age, as expected, is related to greater incumbent support. More politically interested respondents, in contrast, are less pro-incumbent, significantly so in 2014. Negative (but insignificant) signs in both years also occur for Political activity, the other measure of engagement, where a direction of relationship likewise was not hypothesized. Highly significant effects of Economy and Coattails, not surprisingly, always exist. Finally, congressional district-level random effects are significant in both years, specifying that pro-incumbent voting still varies among districts even with all fixed-level effects accounted for.

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[12] See Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2009, 673-81) for an explication of this procedure.

In Table 2, rather than focusing separately on the 2012 and 2014 elections, we consider inter-election transition in voting behavior on the part of redistricted and non-redistricted voters. A potential pitfall with separate analyses is the decline in midterm turnout disproportionately caused by less partisan voters dropping out of the electorate. It is possible, therefore, that voters comprising the more solidly partisan electorate of 2014 were less affected by whether or not they had been redistricted than were the voters of 2012, simply because they more faithfully adhered to party-line voting. Now, only panel respondents who voted both times in districts with the same incumbent on the ballot are analyzed in order to control for the possible confounding effects of differential turnout in the two elections. Greater movement in a pro-incumbent direction by redistricted voters relative to that by non-redistricted voters thus could fairly be attributed to the restoration of the formers' personal vote that had been disrupted in 2012.

For this analysis, we explain incumbent voting in 2014 in terms of the same independent variables employed in Table 1, plus the lagged variable Incvote12 for the respondent's 2012 vote (1 for the incumbent, 0 for the challenger), and the interaction of the lagged vote with whether the respondent was redistricted in 2012. A negative interaction term would then indicate that the lagged vote for redistricted respondents is less predictive of 2014 voting than it is for retained respondents. The results of Table 2 uphold this expectation, revealing a significantly negative parameter for the interaction term (-1.178).

In order to gauge substantive impact, we can compute the expected probability of casting a pro-incumbent ballot in 2014 for redistricted voters who supported the challenger in 2012. (Once again, population average impacts are calculated, this time fixing Redistricted at 1 and Incvote12 at 0.) Fully .362 of the redistricted non-incumbent voters in 2012 are expected to have voted for the incumbent two years later. Presumably for a considerable minority of respondents in this group, therefore, 2012 failure to back their new member on the ballot was indeed a temporary, redistricting-induced phenomenon resulting from a lack of personal vote-style acquaintanceship

Table 2: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of 2012 Redistricting on Voting for House Incumbent in 2014: Determining the Extent to Which Redistricted Voters Opposing Incumbent in 2012 Rebound in Incumbent's Favor Two Years Later

	2014
Fixed Effects of Independent Variables	
Redistricted	.479
	(.422)
Sameparty	2.265***
	(.222)
Incumbent's party	.552
	(.345)
Age	.052**
	(.018)
Interest	-.538**
	(.197)
Political activity	-.028
	(.337)
Economy	.504**
	(.189)
Incvote12	5.392***
	(.516)
Incvote12*Redistricted	-1.178*
	(.692)
Constant	-5.233***
	(1.196)
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts	
House District Level	2.141***
	(.569)
Log-likelihood	-362.405
N of Respondents	3567
N of House Districts	257

Note: Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. One-tail tests were used to determine significance for Redistricted, Sameparty, Age, Economy, and Coattails; two-tail tests were used for Incumbent's party, Interest, and Political activity.

  ***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

        The question then becomes determining how cognitions of the incumbent potentially relevant to the personal vote are related to whether the constituent was redistricted. Cognitions that are equally incumbent-friendly among the redistricted and non-redistricted alike as of 2014 would help explain why the redistricting variable in Table 1 had no significant effect on the likelihood of 2014 pro-incumbent voting. Each of the six cognitions listed above that can be derived from the 2014 CCES will be analyzed toward this end as dependent variables. Once again, only respondents voting in races with a non-first-term incumbent facing a major party challenger are included. The explanatory variables in the analyses replicate those employed in Table 1, with the exception of the two bearing upon nationalization of the House vote. An additional difference is that in the case of the three cognitions of the member that are of a strictly factual nature (Contact, Project, and Knowledge), respondent educational level (Education) is also added (6 if post-graduate, 5 if four-year college degree, 4 if two-year college degree, 3 if some college, 2 if high school graduate, 1 if no high school). More educated voters simply should have better recall of interactions with the member, more familiarity with projects brought into the district by the member, and a greater ability to recognize the member in the first place. Furthermore, aside from being more likely to recall interactions with the member, better-educated respondents should be more aware of the value of initiating these interactions, such as requesting casework assistance.

Table 3 presents the equation parameters of these six analyses.[13] Also included is the parallel 2012 analysis, which will be addressed after first examining the core question of whether incumbent cognitions two years after redistricting are equally incumbent-friendly for the redistricted and non-redistricted alike. As expected, Education matters in the three 2014 equations where it is entered.[14] Where the key independent variable of redistricting makes a difference is in the 2014 equations for Project, Represent, and Knowledge. Redistricted respondents compared to the non-redistricted are less likely in 2014 to be aware of any special project by the member, less positive about his or her quality of representation, and less likely to have heard of the member. Results for the first and third of these variables seem very straightforward. The project question sets no time limit as to the date of the member's accomplishment; thus, respondents having the same member for more than one term would naturally be at an advantage in saying they remember such a project being brought into the district (even were members to try to publicize pre-redistricting projects at community forums or in the media subsequent to 2012). Likewise, a longer history with the same member would make one more likely to have some basic familiarity with that incumbent. The finding pertaining to representation, while less straightforward, nevertheless aligns with Fenno's aforementioned observation that constituent-member relationships built on trust require extended periods of time to evolve.

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[13] The cut points for the multilevel ordered logit equations employing Represent and Approve as the dependent variables, which are not of substantive importance, are the estimated thresholds differentiating regions on the unobservable continuous variables being proxied by the ordinal variables actually used in the analysis, when all independent variables equal zero.

[14] Because of the principally exploratory purpose of our investigations into the determinants of incumbent cognitions, in Table 3 we opt for more conservative two-tail significance tests throughout, even when the expected direction of relationship is clear-cut (e.g., the effect of shared constituent-member partisanship on approval of the member). In no case involving the key Redistricted variable, however, does this affect the conclusion about the variable's significance.

For the other three dependent variables, redistricted respondents in 2014 are not significantly distinctive. However, while perceived ideological proximity to the member that year does not depend upon redistricting, the 2012 result is different. As explained above, the 2012 CCES data do permit contrasting old and new constituents in this regard, unlike the case with the other five cognitions. Questions directed at respondents in both years were addressed in terms of ideological perceptions of the two House candidates rather than just in terms of their preexisting incumbent, so by identifying the candidate with incumbency status we have the necessary information to determine where redistricted constituents place the new incumbent. Here,

Table 3: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of 2012 Redistricting on Cognitions of House Incumbent in 2012 and 2014

	2012	2014					
	Ideological Distance	Contact	Project	Represent	Approve	Knowledge	Ideological Distance
Fixed Effects of Independent Variables							
Redistricted	.231** (.087)	-.169 (.140)	-.661*** (.207)	-.617*** (.179)	-.261 (.180)	-.663* (.281)	.055 (.084)
Same Party	-1.127*** (.046)	-.451*** (.080)	.447*** (.087)	1.895*** (.102)	1.897*** (.106)	.436*** (.120)	-1.241*** (.044)
Incumbent's Party	-.388*** (.084)	-.560*** (.147)	-.151* (.177)	.267 (.162)	.326* (.160)	-.542* (.260)	-.678*** (.086)
Age	.014*** (.003)	.010** (.007)	022** (.008)	.015* (.006)	.014 (.007)	.016 (.011)	-.005 (.003)
Interest	-.182** (.059)	.412** (.132)	.275** (.182)	.069 (.145)	.002 (.107)	1.130*** (.148)	-.023 (.066)
Political activity	.132 (.086)	.738*** (.163)	.572** (.182)	.010 (.143)	.069 (.138)	.461 (.249)	.061 (.073)
Education	---	.202*** (.051)	.129* (.056)	---	---	.164* (.084)	---
Constant	3.945*** (.269)	3.251*** (.607)	-4.352** (.786)	---	---	-2.293* (.966)	3.052*** (.331)
Cut1	---	---	---	.051 (.658)	-1.182* (.464)	---	---

Cut2	---	---	---	2.866*** (.658)	.660 (.420)	---	---
Cut3		---	---	---	3.801*** (.436)	---	---
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts							
House District Level	.355*** (.043)	.683*** (.124)	.905*** (.164)	.861*** (.149)	.926*** (.182)	2.016*** (.386)	.215*** (.043)
Log-likelihood	-12064.038	-1734.85	-1264.847	-1979.785	-2836.848	-733.212	-4714.897
N of Respondents	6935	3695	3468	3325	3610	3683	3599
N of House Districts	339	261	259	254	255	261	261

Note: Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients (Contact, Project, and Knowledge), ordinal logit coefficients (Represent and Approve), and regression coefficients (Ideological distance). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tail significance tests were used for all coefficients.
 ***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

the leftmost column in Table 3 shows that in contrast to 2014, the redistricting variable is significant. New constituents in 2012 are likely to see themselves as ideologically more distant from the perceived position of the member (.231 units further removed on average than are retained constituents).[15] Whether through member efforts over the two-year post-redistricting period to actually shift issue stances in the direction of new constituents or as a result of new constituents on their own coming to see greater compatibility, members clearly are more advantaged in this regard the second time they seek support from these constituent newcomers.[16]

Table 4 presents a more fine-grained examination of contacts with the member experienced by new and old constituents in 2014. Aside from asking the general question of whether the respondent had any contact with the member, the CCES also inquired about the particular form this contact, if any, took. In some cases, the contact was member-initiated (e.g., a communication sent from the member's office). In other cases, the constituent likely took the initiative, perhaps in response, however, to prior messaging by the member encouraging such interaction (e.g., publicizing a community forum hosted by the member). Even though overall contact did not depend in Table 3 upon whether the constituent had been redistricted, perhaps specific forms of contact were affected. The categories of contact are the following:

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[15]In some cases, ideological estrangement experienced by centrist transplants in the immediate post-redistricting election might result from their assumption that the new member on the ballot would merely vote as a party loyalist, despite actually having compiled a moderate roll call voting record in the past. Brown cites the case of moderate Utah Democratic House member Jim Matheson, who decided to shift to a newly created district in 2012 because of fear that Republican constituents moved into his old district would see him merely as a generic liberal Democrat (2013, 38-42).

[16] We also investigated whether the effects of redistricting uncovered in Table 3 varied depending upon whether constituents did or did not identify with the party of the incumbent. The equations of Table 3 were thus re-estimated, adding an independent variable for the interaction between Redistricted and Same party. Insignificant interaction terms, however, resulted in five of the total seven analyses, with the sole exceptions occurring in the equations for Knowledge in 2014 and Ideological distance in 2012, where negative and positive terms, respectively, were obtained. This signifies that when same-party partisans are contrasted with opposition-party partisans, redistricting for the former takes a greater toll on knowledge of the incumbent in 2014 and on perceived ideological distance from the incumbent in 2012.

Visit (visiting the member's office)
Call (calling the member's office)
Send (sending email or a letter to the member)
Receive mail (receiving mail or email from the member)
Receive call (receiving a call from the member)
Meet (meeting the member at a public event)
Other (some other form of contact).

With each form of contact employed separately as the dependent variable in multilevel logit analysis in Table 4, where 1 indicates contact and 0 no contact, the redistricting variable fails to attain significance six times.[17]

The sole exception is receiving a call from the member, where redistricted constituents are less likely to experience this. Overall, though, regardless of how constituent-member interaction may have arisen over the two-year period following boundary realignment, members are just as much in touch with their new constituents as with old constituents.

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[17] As in Table 3, two-tail significance tests are employed in Table 4 to accord with the exploratory nature of the analysis. Also as before, this makes no difference for conclusions about the significance of Redistricted.

Table 4: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of 2012 Redistricting on Components of Contact with House Incumbent in 2014

	2014						
	Visit	**Call**	**Send**	**Receive Mail**	**Receive Call**	**Meet**	**Other**
Fixed Effects of Independent Variables							
Redistricted	.255	-.303	-.127	-.004	-.565*	-.297	-.084
	(.534)	(.318)	(.161)	(.146)	(.260)	(.339)	(.349)
Sameparty	.694**	.098	.151	.414***	.349**	.609***	.085
	(.221)	(.127)	(.085)	(.080)	(.125)	(.143)	(.177)
Incumbent's party	.368	-.148	.199	.493***	1.011***	.377	-.042
	(.409)	(.229)	(.169)	(.135)	(.230)	(.251)	(.298)
Age	-.018	.009	-0.010	.009	.003	-.015	.033**
	(.022)	(.011)	(.007)	(.007)	(.011)	(.013)	(.010)
Interest	.709	1.093*	1.002***	.601***	.097	.239	-.303
	(.420)	(.506)	(.173)	(.154)	(.231)	(.314)	(.261)
Political activity	2.352***	1.373***	.924***	.606***	.450*	1.886***	.016
	(.625)	(.313)	(.169)	(.159)	(.222)	(.302)	(.321)
Education	.116	.172***	.231***	.135**	-.032	.329***	.188*
	(.127)	(.083)	(.055)	(.046)	(.076)	(.084)	(.090)
Constant	9.294***	9.453***	-6.388***	-4.297***	-3.693***	-6.159***	5.847***
	(1.482)	(1.977)	(.677)	(.653)	(1.108)	(1.331)	(1.100)
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts							
House District Level	1.282***	.608***	.702***	.481***	1.246***	.998***	1.100*
	(.615)	(.275)	(.185)	(.104)	(.224)	(.215)	(.562)
Log-likelihood	-182.777	-463.117	-1192.342	-1733.718	-942.18	-550.249	-194.818
N of Respondents	6695	3695	3695	3695	3695	3695	3695
N of House Districts	261	261	261	261	261	261	261

Note: Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tail significance tests were used for all coefficients.

***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

How Pro-Incumbent Voting is Affected by the Six Cognitions

The analysis now shifts toward determining just how the six incumbent cognitions affect voting behavior. Cognitions that are less favorable among redistricted constituents than among continuing constituents and that also affect voting behavior work against the reelection fortunes of the member in 2014. Those that are no less favorable among redistricted constituents, or that do not influence voting regardless of whether they are any less favorable among the redistricted, mean that the member is insulated from electoral damage.

Table 5 replicates the prior analysis in Table 1 of voting decisions in 2012 and 2014, this time with the cognitions added to the equations. (Insert Table 5 here) Once again starting with the more central 2014 analysis, redistricting, of course, continues in column two to have no effect on pro-incumbent voting. The only differences from the control variable parameters appearing in Table 1 is that Incumbent's party and Age are no longer significant. Three of the cognitions - - contact with the member, belief that the district is well represented, and approval of him or her - - significantly improve the odds of incumbent support, while less ideological distance from the member barely falls short of significantly doing this (p=.054). The other two - - awareness of any project brought into the district by the member and familiarity with the member's name - - make no difference. Nonetheless, redistricted constituents were previously found in Table 3 to be less incumbent-friendly on project awareness and name familiarity than were the non-redistricted. So, these two cognitions still could have weakened incumbent safety if they related to voting for the redistricted despite failing to affect constituent voting generally. Column three tests this possibility by interacting the cognitions with Redistricted. However, the insignificance of both interactions demonstrates that the lack of electoral impact exists for redistricted and non-redistricted constituents alike, indicating that the depressed incumbent-friendliness of the cognitions among the former group does not reduce reelection safety.

Evaluation of how well the member represents the district is unique among the six cognitions in that it is weaker among new constituents at the same time that it influences 2014 balloting. Thus, this factor alone does impair incumbent safety. To address the question of how much impairment actually results, we first calculate the expected probability of pro-incumbent voting in 2014 were all voters to have the identical mean value on

Table 5: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of 2012 Redistricting on Voting for House Incumbent in 2012 and 2014 Adding Cognitions of the Incumbent to the Equations

Fixed Effects of Independent Variables	2012	2014 (w/o interactions)	2014 (w/ interactions)
Redistricted	-.362*	.304	.703
	(.211)	(.400)	(1.083)
Same Party	1.691***	3.117***	3.118***
	(.149)	(.285)	(.286)
Incumbent's Party	-.255	.384	.382
	(.229)	(.436)	(.433)
Age	.012*	.024	023
	(.007)	(.018)	(.017)
Interest	-.250	-.850**	-.862**
	(.157)	(.305)	(.301)
Political activity	.061	-.331	-.317
	(.277)	(.411)	(.411)
Contact	---	.651*	.664*
		(.384)	(.389)
Project	---	.452	.465
		(.477)	(.585)
Represent	---	1.822***	1.816***
		(.441)	(.449)
Approve	---	2.632***	2.638***
		(.373)	(.374)
Knowledge	---	.277	.418
		(.707)	(.956)
Ideological Distance	-.561***	-.298	-.305*
	(.078)	(.186)	(.193)
Economy	.316**	.693***	.692***
	(.115)	(.213)	(.213)
Coattails	3.556***	---	---
	(.296)		
Project*Redistricted	---	---	-.059
			(1.036)
Knowledge*Redistricted	---	---	-.474
			(1.194)
Constant	-.277	-9.025***	-9.042***
	(.836)	(1.985)	(1.981)
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts			
House District Level	1.488***	1.986***	2.016***
	(.279)	(.593)	(.594)
Log-likelihood	-793.424	-194.448	-194.338
N of Respondents	6221	3018	3018
N of House Districts	337	251	251

Note: Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. One-tail tests were used to determine significance for Redistricted, Sameparty, Age, Economy, and Coattails; two-tail tests used for Incumbent's party, Interest, and Political activity.
 ***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

representation that obtains for non-redistricted respondents (2.074 on the three point Represent scale, where higher values indicate more favorable evaluations). Then, this probability is compared to the expected probability occurring when only non-redistricted voters are assigned the 2.074 value on Represent, at the same time that redistricted voters are all assigned their lower, actual 1.936 mean value. The two expected probabilities of pro-incumbent voting that result are then .623 and .621, respectively. So the lower ratings by new constituents of the incumbent's ability to represent the district have only a marginal effect in reducing incumbency safety levels.

Finally, the first column in Table 5 contains the results of the analogous analysis of voting in 2012, this time, of course, under the constraint of being able to add only ideological distance, the sole incumbent cognition variable available for redistricted constituents that year. The highly significant coefficient of this variable, combined with the fact that redistricted constituents in 2012, unlike in 2014, saw themselves as more ideologically divorced from their House member than were retained constituents, suggests that reduction in incumbents' ideological distance from redistricted constituents may have contributed to their electoral improvement in 2014.

A probe into this possibility is performed in Table 6, where change in the Ideological distance variable across the two elections is related to change in pro-incumbent voting behavior. The dependent variable takes the form of 1 for voters who shift from a non-incumbent vote in 2012 to a pro-incumbent vote in 2014, and 0 otherwise. Only respondents voting both times in districts with two-party competition and the same incumbent on the ballot are included. Ideological distance change, measured in terms of Ideological distance in 2014 minus that in 2012, can then be expected to have a negative coefficient if movement toward greater perceived closeness to the member leads to more incumbent support.[18] Non-redistricted respondents, who, on the whole, do not move into greater ideological alignment with the incumbent across the two-year period (mean ideological distance change=.022 among cases included in the analysis), are analyzed in column one. Redistricted respondents, who do move into greater alignment (mean ideological distance change=-.178), are analyzed in column two. The expectation is that changes in ideological distance should matter more for

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[18]A one-tail significance test is applied in Table 6 just to the Ideological distance change variable, where it is the only variable to have a hypothesized direction of relationship with the voting change dependent variable.

redistricted respondents. For non-redistricted voters owing to their longer term familiarity with the incumbent, perceived member ideology would remain relatively fixed from 2012-14, even if the incumbent did shift positions somewhat to appeal to new constituents. Consequently, much of the minimal individual movements in ideological distance that did occur likely would have a substantial random component with little impact on voting change. For redistricted voters, in contrast, much of their ideological distance change would be a real response to learning more about the new incumbent's ideology over two years, which should therefore make more of a difference on voting change.

        The results demonstrate that this expectation is met. Only for the redistricted does the ideological distance change variable significantly affect change in the likelihood of voting for the incumbent.

 Therefore, ideological distance change considered by itself seems responsible for at least some of the recovery in incumbent support manifested by redistricted respondents.

Table 6: Multilevel Analysis of Effects of Ideological Distance Change on 2012-2014 Electoral Movement from Challenger to Incumbent

Fixed Effects of Independent Variables	Non-Redistricted Constituents	Redistricted Constituents
Same Party	-.605*	.792
	(.284)	(.453)
Incumbent's Party	.032	.576
	(.426)	(.563)
Age	.031**	.042**
	(.010)	(.015)
Interest	-.388	-.549
	(.247)	(.380)
Political activity	.112	1.695
	(.338)	(.901)
Economy	.320	-.413
	(.276)	(.371)
Ideological Distance Change	-.094	-.442*
	(.166)	(.194)
Constant	-5.957***	-5.321***
	(1.254)	(1.579)
Variances of Random Effects Intercepts		
House District Level	.558	.616***
	(.641)	(1.525)
Log-likelihood	-142.106	-68.296
N of Respondents	2460	957
N of House Districts	245	198

Note:Fixed Effects entries for independent variables are binomial logit coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. One-tail tests used to determine significance for Ideological distance change; two-tail tests used for Sameparty, Incumbent's party, Age, Interest, Political activity, and Economy.

***Significant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; *significant at .05 level.

Summary and Conclusions

While tentative, the evidence arising from this study suggests that reduction in the reelection threat to incumbents posed by redistricted constituents two years after boundary change is linked to improvement in cognitions of the incumbent across this same period. Three of the six cognitions considered here (Contact, Approve, and Ideological distance) relate to incumbent safety margins in 2014, but are equally positive that year among the redistricted and non-redistricted alike. Thus, they have no effect in lowering reelection margins. And of the three cognitions that are less positive in 2014 among redistricted constituents (Project, Represent, and Knowledge), only the second makes an electoral difference, but not to the point of causing much damage to the incumbent.

Underlying our analysis, of course, has been the assumption that compared to 2014, the corresponding cognitions in 2012 held by the redistricted would be less favorable to the incumbent than were those of continuing constituents. There is no obvious way to confirm this in the case of five of the cognitions, because of the non-existence of relevant data in 2012. For the one cognition that is available that year - - perceived ideological distance from the member - - the results are compatible with this assumption, in that redistricted constituents in fact see themselves as more distant than do the non-redistricted, whereas the difference did not persist into 2014. More directly, the reduction in perceived ideological distance by redistricted constituents across the two elections does relate to greater incumbent safety.

It is reasonable to think, however, that if 2012 data were available for the other five cognitions and comparable analysis undertaken, the cumulative effect of all cognitions would explain a good share of incumbent recovery across the two election period. Values of each cognition in 2012 would likely have been less incumbent-friendly for new constituents relative to those for old constituents than was the case in 2014.[19] For example, given what has been said above about the importance of the passage of time for the

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[19] Note that in work relying upon American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data, McKee (2008b, 968-72) finds that in both 1992 and 2002 recognition of House incumbents was considerably higher among constituents who kept the same incumbent than among those redistricted into a new district (recognition is defined as the capacity to rate the incumbent on the 0-100 degree feeling thermometer scale). With regard to the ability on one's own to correctly recall the incumbent's name (where the ANES question was only asked in 1992), continuing constituents once again were significantly better informed than redistricted constituents.

development of trust in one's member, plus the fact that redistricted constituents in 2014 had less positive evaluations of their members' representational quality, it is hard to imagine that an imbalance of even greater magnitude would not have existed in 2012 (in addition to the likelihood that fewer new constituents in 2012 would have felt able to answer the question in the first place).

Perhaps most important from the standpoint of lower pro-incumbent voting in 2012, however, is the contact variable. Some new voters certainly would have been the target of outreach efforts by their new incumbent before election day in 2012 (e.g., through informal district offices established in the appended areas). Still, far fewer newcomers could be expected to have had such incumbent interaction in the relatively brief window before the election than the number of continuing constituents having contact during the prior two year pre-redistricting period. Furthermore, redistricted constituents seeking casework assistance in 2012 probably would be less likely on their own to initiate contact with the new member than with their preexisting member, who still officially represented them. But the next two years afford members ample opportunity to erase this deficit, as we have seen, with regard to almost all specific forms of interaction. So even in this period of hyper-polarization and intense party-centered voting, members still had the ability to ameliorate the electoral damage done by redistricting through vigorous employment of the perquisites available to enhance the contact component of their personal vote.

Since that time period, of course, the impact of the personal vote on reelection fortunes has continued to diminish in tandem with movement toward even more voting along partisan lines. Jacobson calculates that the electoral bonus derived from incumbency status per se declined from a high of 12.1 percent in 1986 to 3.7 percent in 2014 and 1.5 percent in 2022 (2023, 12). Thus, the overall urgency of constituency outreach activities for members may be less. On the other hand, as noted by Jacobson and Carson, from the standpoint of ideological outliers in Congress dedicated to fostering foundational policy transformation, the potential risks associated with such endeavors might well be offset by continued strong district focus (2020, 56). At least for these members, therefore, the emphasis on personal contact we have found to exist in the previous decade can be expected to persist.

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