Rise of Moderate Islamic Parties: Who Supports Them?

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While the debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not continue, support for Islamic-oriented political parties has considerably increased since the 1980s. This paper explores factors that lead to support for moderate Islamic parties with an individual level quantitative analysis of Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey by using the fifth wave World Values Survey. While it is common to question Islamic parties’ ideology and attitudes towards liberal democratic principles, attitudes of people who support those parties are largely ignored. This paper argues that the driving force for supporting moderate Islamic parties depends on the sociopolitical context. The findings show that in secular and partly-free democracies such as Turkey and Indonesia, support for moderate Islamic parties indicates a protest against the secular elite and a demand for a more religious role in government. On the other hand, in semi-authoritarian monarchies like Morocco, where ultimate power relies on the King, political parties tend to cooperate with the Monarchy for survival concerns, support for moderate Islamic parties reflects approval of the religious monarchy rather than opposing it.

Introduction

While the debates about whether Islam and democracy can coexist or not continue, support for Islamic-oriented political parties has considerably increased since the 1980s. Attempts by Islamic parties to participate in political systems in semi-democratic Muslim societies are crucial in understanding the democratic consolidation of these countries. While some scholars regard the Islamic political parties’ participation in newly emerging democracies as a threat to the secular democracy, others contend that the inclusion of these Islamic parties leads to moderation and hence helps democratic consolidation (Schwedler 1998). Indeed, there is a growing trend of shifting from ideology oriented policies to moderate pragmatic policies among Islamic oriented parties and a growing support for these moderate Islamic parties (Nasr 2005). Scholarly interest in moderate Islamic parties has recently increased since these parties may play a crucial role in the democratization process of Muslim countries in the post-Arab Spring period.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by exploring factors that lead to support for moderate Islamic parties with an individual level quantitative analysis of Indonesia, Morocco and Turkey. The existing literature on Islamic parties overwhelmingly focuses on what is happening internal to these parties, and what mechanisms lead the parties to change. Yet, socio-economic and political characteristics of voters who support these parties remains underexplored. While it is common to question Islamic parties’ ideology and attitudes towards liberal democratic principles, attitudes of their constituency are largely ignored. This paper shifts the focus to ask, how do changing socio-economic and political context affect the profile of the people who support moderate Islamic parties? This study compares attitudes and other socio-economic characteristics of people who support moderate Islamic parties with the rest of the population in two different settings; a partly-free secular democracy and a semi-authoritarian monarchy. In a partly-free democracy, while there are some limitations on freedoms and occasional interruptions in the elected governments via the military coups, the political system still provides an opportunity to challenge the ruling elite and citizens can change their government democratically. Therefore, moderate Islamic parties are viable actors to challenge the ruling elite and a vote for moderate Islamic parties in this political context reflects an opposition vote against the secular elite. On the contrary, in a semi-authoritarian monarchy, the King dominates the elected government and holds the right to dissolve the parliament (Drhimeur 2018). There is little room for effective democracy and political parties tend to cooperate with the King (rather than competing against him) for survival concerns. Under these repressive conditions and institutional constraints, a vote for a moderate Islamic party simply reflects approval of the authoritarian system, not an opposition to it. There are several arguments that exist in the literature which try to explain the rise of Islamist parties but there is little quantitative evidence supporting these arguments. Moreover, the existing studies look at the support for Islamic parties in general rather than moderate Islamic parties in particular.

All of the Islamic parties have an adherence to Islamic identity and an objective of advancing an Islamic way of life. However, they vary in terms of ideology and policy preferences from very radical to moderate. Nasr (2005) divides political Islam into two subgroups: Islamists and Muslim Democrats. Islamists view democracy as a tool to build an Islamist state whereas Muslim Democrats view political life pragmatically and use Islam’s potential to gain votes. Moderate Islamic parties, which will be the focus of this study, are those which belong to the second group. Schwedler (1998) defines moderates
As “Islamic groups and activists who formally declare their respect for and commitment to pluralism and their democratic principles and denounce the use of violence in achieving their objectives” (27). It is a difficult task to determine the moderateness of these parties and the expectations of the ruling elite. Indeed, there exists great variation—both among Islamists and others—as to what the notion of moderation refers (Karakaya and Yildirim 2013). In this paper, I adopt Schwedler’s (1998) definition of moderates.

Conventionally, Islamic parties are considered to have similar constituencies in their respective societies across the Muslim world. Yet, a closer look into the Muslim world suggests that the sociopolitical environment in Muslim-majority countries shows great variance. On the one hand, in countries like Turkey and Indonesia, a more secular environment reigns with some limitations on religious freedom. On the other hand, in countries like Morocco, there is greater emphasis on religion in public life, and the religious legitimacy of the ruler. In other words, in Morocco, moderate Islamic parties are constrained by a semi-authoritarian Monarchy, whereas in Turkey and Indonesia, these parties are constrained by the secular elite who are obviously less repressive than the Monarch. However, we do not have a clear indication in the literature as to whether societal support for moderate Islamic parties shows any qualitative difference across countries in the Muslim world. This observation begs the following question: Although moderate Islamic parties run on similar political platforms in differing political contexts, do their support bases show any marked difference across countries? The answer to this question will be provided in the following analysis.

This article is organized as follows. First, I review the Islamic parties’ struggle to survive in semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian systems and discuss the moderation theory. Second, I briefly discuss existing arguments that are claimed to affect electoral support for Islamic parties. Third, I describe the data, methods, and the research design. Then, I discuss the empirical findings. Finally, I provide a brief conclusion in which I discuss the implications of these findings as well as the limitations of this research.

Islamic Political Parties

Islamist parties’ emergence and proliferation started with the end of the colonial period in the Middle East. The mobilizing power of Islam was used during national liberation from colonial rulers. Once these countries gained independence, most of the Islamist parties were oppressed under totalitarian
regimes until the 1980s. In the 1980s, the Iranian Revolution increased the political role of Islam in the Middle East and contributed to support for Islamist parties. In the 1990s, the number of Islamist parties increased due to the third wave of democratization (Salih 2009).

Some scholars and policy makers contend that Islamist parties’ participation should be viewed with caution since they might have the hidden agenda of changing the regime and establishing an Islamic state once they come to power (Schwedler 1998). Schwedler (1998) calls this possibility ‘the paradox of democracy’; the idea that democratic process might empower nondemocratic actors. Yet, this fear and skepticism about Islamic parties’ democratic commitment is ironically used to justify undemocratic and repressive policies by the secular elite such as political party closures in Turkey’s case and canceling elections in Algeria after the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party won the first round of elections in 1991.

On the other hand, some scholars argue that Islamist parties would not risk losing their legitimacy and popular support by abolishing democracy (Simo and Khamani 2009). Kalyvas (2000) points out that rational challengers (religious parties) will have an incentive to signal that once in power they will behave moderately. However, their credibility is undermined by their ideological principles that are contrary to liberal democracy. For example, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkey used to be a successful example of a moderate Islamic party which managed to integrate liberal values with Islamic culture. The AKP came to power in 2002 and accomplished numerous democratic reforms until 2007. However, the democratization process slowed down after 2007 and after the consolidation of power and re-elections in 2007, 2011, and 2015. The AKP increased authoritarian and illiberal policies such as shutting down opposition media outlets and putting journalists in jail since 2013. The democratic backsliding of Turkey and repressive policies under the AKP government considerably increased after the failed military coup attempt in July 2016. To sum up, the exact role of moderate Islamist parties in a flourishing democracy in the Muslim world remains unclear.

Nasr (2005) is optimistic about moderation of Islamist parties and states the following:

In Muslim societies, the vital center of politics is likely to belong to neither secularists nor leftist parties nor to Islamists. More likely to rule the strategic middle will be political forces that integrate Muslim values and moderate
Islamic politics into broader right of center platforms that go beyond exclusively religious concerns. Such forces can appeal to a broad cross-section of voters and create a stable nexus between religious and secular drivers of electoral politics (14–15).

The rise of Muslim democrats and successful moderation of Islamist parties is a recent phenomenon. Moderate Islamic parties emphasize social but not political dimensions of Islam and liberal economic policies whereas Islamist parties advocate anti-global, state-oriented economic policies and political conceptualization of Islam (Yildirim 2015). As Somer (2014) points out, it is not possible to theorize moderation by focusing only on Islamist actors; we need to examine both secular and religious actors and the socio-political context in which Islamist parties operate. According to the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, Islamist parties tend to moderate once they are allowed to participate in a political system due to institutional constraints and a desire to appeal to median voter (Schwedler 2006; Wickham 2004). Moreover, according to the social learning hypothesis, interaction between Islamist leaders and other leaders facilitates a development of tolerance and accommodative attitudes (Wickham 2004). Clark (2006) argues that merely stating that the participation in the political system leads to moderation is not a sufficient hypothesis; one needs to determine conditions under which the cooperation or participation leads to moderation. Clark (2006) claims that there are still some barriers to cooperation of Islamist parties in issues which are fully addressed by Islamic law such as honor killing, divorce, and quotas for women in the parliament. Nasr (2005) contends that Muslim democrats rose in countries where the military formally withdrew from politics but remained a powerful player, the private sector was strengthened by liberal economic policies, and a strong political competition for gaining votes existed. Nasr (2005) gives examples of Turkey and Indonesia in which these three prerequisites existed and Muslim democrats rose. However, moderate Islamic parties also emerged in Egypt and Morocco in which these prerequisites did not exist.

Institutional structure is another factor which affects the moderation of Islamist parties (Permata 2008; Schwedler 2013). According to Permata (2008), the shift from ideological to pragmatic policies stems from changes in institutional structure. If institutions are weak, Islamist parties are expected to act ideologically; if the institutions are strong and stable, they act pragmatically and moderate. Finally, previous studies suggest that state repression (Somer 2007), competitive economic liberalization (Sokhey and
What Explains Electoral Support for Moderate Islamic Parties?

There is no consensus among scholars or policy makers about whether Islamic parties can successfully moderate and can be incorporated into secular democratic systems or not. Yet, electoral support for moderate Islamic parties has considerably increased in recent years. While Kurzman and Naqvi’s (2010) study shows that Islamist parties in general do not perform well in elections, Yildirim and Lancaster (2015) find that moderation positively affects electoral support for Islamist parties. Moreover, Schwedler (1998) notes that repressive state policies such as manipulation of elections and electoral laws might be the reason for poor performance of Islamist parties in elections. Turkey’s AKP is the most striking example of a moderate Islamic party which came to power in 2002 elections and was reelected in 2007, 2011, and 2015. The success of AKP is largely explained by its moderation (Gumuscu 2010). In Indonesia, Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an urban based Islamic party increased its vote 450% by taking 7.3% of the total votes and becoming a coalition member of government whereas the secular PDI-P decreased its rate from 34% (in 1999) to 20% in the 2004 elections (Permata 2008). The PKS took 8.2% of votes in the 2009 elections and became a coalition member but PKS’s vote share decreased to 6.8% in the 2014 legislative elections. In Morocco, the Islamic Party of Justice and Development (PJD) increased the number of seats from 14 in 1997 to 42 in the 2002 elections, 46 seats in the 2007 elections, and 110 seats in the 2011 elections (out of 325 seats). Popularity of moderate Islamic parties increased even more after the Arab Spring; the PJD in Morocco, Ennahda party in Tunisia, and the MB in Egypt all won in recent elections.

There are several explanations for the growing support for Islamic parties in the literature, some of which may be valid for moderate Islamic parties as well. The existing arguments focus on two major factors as a determinant of supporting Islamist parties: ideological orientations (attitudes about democracy, autocracy, and religion) and socio-economic characteristics. However, the moderate Islamic and radical Islamic parties have different ideologies and policy agendas. Therefore, societal bases of support for those parties might also be different. Moreover, different political context and structural constraints might change the profile of supporters of these parties.
This paper compares attitudes of people who support moderate Islamic parties in secular, partly-free democracies and semi-authoritarian monarchies. As Ayoob (2006) points out, there are various manifestations of political Islam and the context in which the Islamist parties operate largely determines different manifestations of political Islam. I argue that the driving force for supporting moderate Islamic parties also differs according to the sociopolitical environment. In partly-free, secular democracies like Turkey and Indonesia, the political system provides the opportunity to legally challenge the power of the secular elite via elections and moderate Islamic parties are viable actors that usually attract opposition votes. On the other hand, in semi-authoritarian countries such as Morocco, the ultimate power relies on the Monarch and structural constraints make it very hard to actually challenge the power of Monarch if not impossible. Political parties tend to cooperate with the King for survival concerns rather than opposing him. Indeed, the Moroccan PJD recognizes the King as ‘Commander of the faithful’ while the King encourages moderate Islamists (against radical ones) as a divide and rule tactic (Howe 2005). In the Moroccan case, where there is a cooperation rather than competition between the moderate PJD and the King, support for moderate Islamic parties reflects approval of the religious monarchy. In short, in the Turkey and Indonesia cases, where the political system is less repressive than a semi-authoritarian regime, support for moderate Islamic parties indicates a protest against the secular elite and a demand for a more religious role in government. The following hypotheses will be used to test this argument:

**Hypothesis 1:** In partly-free secular democracies, supporters of moderate Islamic parties have more anti-secular attitudes, show support for a greater role of religion in government, and are more religious than the rest of the population.

**Hypothesis 2:** In semi-authoritarian monarchies where systemic constraints encourage cooperation with the King rather than competition, supporters of moderate Islamic parties are more supportive of the Monarchy and are more religious than the rest of the population.

According to Garcia-Rivero and Kotzé (2007), “support for Islamist parties is not driven by a direct rejection of democratic forms of government, but rather by a rejection of the repressive state apparatus in these countries” (612). Garcia-Rivero and Kotzé (2007) analyzed voters of Islamic parties in Algeria, Jordan, Turkey, and Morocco and found those who voted for Islamist parties do not trust the state, demand more religion within the state but do not reject democratic principles. However, the level of support for Islamic parties in those countries was low when the survey was done.
(between the years of 2000 and 2002) and the authors do not provide any possible explanations for the relatively little support for these parties at that time. In other words, they try to explain the support for Islamist parties in countries where these parties lacked significant popular support. This study utilizes data from the fifth wave of the World Value Survey which was conducted between the years 2005–2008 in which Islamist parties’ popularity considerably increased.

According to social grievances hypothesis, electoral support for Islamist parties is due to corruption, lack of order, social and economic chaos which resulted from policy failures of traditional political parties or autocratic rulers. It is argued that people turn to Islamic parties as a viable opposition party. (Masoud 2014; Tanwir 2002; Tessler 1997). Indeed, in many Muslim countries, Islamic parties are the main opposition parties. The social grievance hypotheses might explain support for these parties where they do not have a significant ruling power such as Indonesia. However, this argument should not be valid in the Turkey case since unlike other countries, the AKP is the ruling party in Turkey and they were reelected for a second term in 2007 (The same year the survey was done). Therefore, I expect ideological explanations to play a greater role than social grievances in explaining support for the AKP in Turkey. The following hypotheses will test these arguments:

**Hypothesis 3-a:** People who have social grievances such as financial problems, belonging to lower classes and who do not trust political institutions are more supportive of moderate Islamic parties than the rest of the population in countries where these parties are not in power.

**Hypothesis 3-b:** In countries where the moderate Islamic party is in power, ideological factors rather than socio-economic factors affect the likelihood of supporting moderate Islamic parties.

**Data, Methods and Research Design**

To test these hypotheses, I use the fifth wave World Value Survey data which were conducted between the years 2005–2008. Specifically, I examine data from Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco. The World Value Surveys include face to face interviews and ask detailed questions about political and religious attitudes and the socio-economic status of the respondents which will help to operationalize my concepts and test my hypotheses.

**Dependent Variable**
The dependent variable is the electoral support for moderate Islamic parties. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use a logistic regression statistical estimator to test my hypotheses. The respondents who would like to vote for a moderate Islamist party are coded as 1 and the rest are coded as 0. Three separate dummy variables are created to measure the support for moderate Islamic parties in Indonesia, Morocco, and Turkey. Schwedler (1998) defines moderates as “Islamic groups and activists who formally declare their respect for and commitment to pluralism and their democratic principles and denounce the use of violence in achieving their objectives” (27). The AKP in Turkey, the PKS in Indonesia, and the PJD in Morocco are defined as moderate Islamic parties. The AKP’s, the PKS’s, and the PJD’s policy preferences and the statements of party leaders follow a moderate path. Although there are other Islamic oriented parties that compete in the electoral system such as the Felicity Party in Turkey and the National Awakening Party in Indonesia, these are not included in the analysis since their characteristics do not fit into the definition of a moderate Islamic party.

**Independent Variables**

There are a number of independent variables which are expected to influence support for moderate Islamic parties. These variables are summarized below.

**Religiosity:** A dummy variable for respondents who self-define themselves as religious is created to measure religiosity. I also use the question that asks the respondents to specify how often they attend religious services, on a seven point scale, the higher values indicating decreasing religious service attendance. This question is a good proxy of religiosity and has been widely used by scholars.

**Attitudes about Secularism:** I create an index to measure attitudes about secularism by using the following questions asked in the survey. The higher values indicate increasing anti-secular attitudes.

- How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections. Religious leaders should not influence government decisions. It would be better if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.
Atitudes about democracy and autocracy: The attitudes about democracy, autocracy and the evaluation of democratization of the respondent’s countries are captured by the following questions:

- I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
- Political system: Having a democratic political system. The answer to this question is called ‘evaluation of democracy’ variable. Higher values indicate harsher evaluation of democracy.
- And how democratically is this country being governed today? (A scale from 1 to 10 is used, where 1 means that it is not at all democratic and 10 means that it is completely democratic). The answer to this question is called ‘democratic satisfaction’ variable in the regression model.
- Political system: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- Political system: Having army rule.
- Political system: Having experts make decisions. I created an index for autocracy by combining the questions about having strong leader, having army rule and having experts. The increasing values indicate decreasing support for autocracy.

Financial Problems: The following questions will be utilized to capture the financial situation of the respondent:

- During the past year, did your family: Save money 2) Just get by 3) Spent some savings 4) Spent savings and borrowed money. Those who selected number 3 and 4 are coded as 1 and the rest are coded as 0.
- How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (1 to 10 scale, 1: completely dissatisfied 10: completely satisfied.

Middle Class: I created a dummy variable for those who belong to upper middle class and upper class to capture the impact on social class on the likelihood of supporting moderate Islamic parties by using the following question:

- People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:1) Upper class 2) Upper middle class 3) Lower middle class 4) Working class 5) Lower class.
Trust in Political Institutions: I created an index to measure trust in political institutions by using the following questions. The higher values indicate decreasing trust in government, the parliament and the political parties.

- I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Confidence: the government, the political parties and the parliament.

Education and age: I use the question asking the respondents the highest educational level attained in order to control for education. I also create a dummy variable for the respondents between 15–35 years old to see whether Islamic parties appeal to younger people or not.

The model can be summarized as the following:

\[
\text{Prob. of supporting moderate Islamic parties (Y=1)} = \text{constant} + \beta_1 \text{Religious} + \beta_2 \text{Decreasing religious service attendance} + \beta_3 \text{Anti-secular} + \beta_4 \\
+ \beta_5 \text{Lack of political trust} + \beta_6 \text{Anti-autocracy} + \beta_7 \text{Democratic satisfaction} + \beta_8 \text{Evaluation of democracy} + \beta_9 \text{Middleclass} + \beta_{10} \text{Spent money} + \beta_{11} \text{Young} + \beta_{12} \text{Education}
\]

Findings

According to the regression analysis, religiosity, religious service attendance, anti-secular attitudes, and lack of political trust significantly affect the likelihood of supporting the AKP in Turkey. The respondents who define themselves as religious, who attend religious services, who have anti-secular attitudes, and who trust in political institutions are more likely to support the AKP than the rest of the population. These findings provide support for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3-b. Ideological factors indeed play an important role in the decision to support the moderate AKP in Turkey. Popularity of the AKP indicates a protest against the secular elite. Even though the secular elite in Turkey (which mainly consisted of military leaders and the Constitutional Court) gradually lost power and there is no pressure on religious/conservative people today, they were still powerful actors at the time when the surveys were conducted. The repressive policies by the secular elite in the past such as the headscarf ban and the closure of religious parties probably increased support for the AKP among religious and anti-secular voters during this period. Paradoxically, secular and liberal people have recently started to complain about the increasing authoritarian policies of the AKP and decreasing liberties. The 2013 Gezi protests is a recent example which shows dissatisfaction with recent developments in
Turkey. Unlike ideological and religious factors, socio-economic factors such as belonging to the middle class, financial satisfaction, and the level of education do not have any significant impact on the likelihood of supporting the AKP. Model 1 in Table 1 summarizes statistical findings of the Turkey case.

Table 1: Support for Moderate Islamic Parties in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>AKP (Turkey)</th>
<th>PKS (Indonesia)</th>
<th>PJD (Morocco)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>1.156***</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>1.755***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.290)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less religious attendance</td>
<td>-0.101**</td>
<td>-0.174***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-secular</td>
<td>0.391***</td>
<td>0.387***</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political trust</td>
<td>-0.278***</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-autocracy</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.099*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic satisfaction</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.085*</td>
<td>0.202***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of democracy</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent money</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.503**</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial satisfaction</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.621***</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although we can infer statistical significance and direction of causality from the logistic regression, the size of the coefficients does not tell anything about the substantive impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In order to capture the substantive impact of each significant independent variable on the likelihood of supporting moderate Islamic parties, I calculate the predicted probability of supporting moderate Islamic parties for fixed values of all independent variables. I hold all dummy variables at 0 and all continuous variables at their mean value. Then I increase the value of one independent variable by one standard deviation if it is a continuous variable or shift it from 0 to 1 if it is a dummy variable while holding all other variables constant and calculate the probability of
supporting moderate Islamic parties. Increasing the variable *anti-secular* by one standard deviation, leads to 54% increase in the probability of supporting the AKP while all dummy variables are held constant at 0, and all continuous variables are held at their mean value. Similarly, shifting the variable *religious* from 0 to 1 yields a 136% increase in the probability of supporting the AKP whereas one standard deviation increase in *religious service attendance* yields a 19.7% increase in the probability of supporting the AKP. Lastly, one standard deviation increase in the level of *political trust* yields a 40% increase in the probability of supporting the AKP. These findings suggest that ideological factors seem to play a very significant role in decision to support the AKP.

Model 2 shows the results for Indonesia. Like Turkey, those who have more anti-secular attitudes and who attend religious services are more likely to support moderate Islamic parties in Indonesia. When all dummy variables are held constant at 0 and all continuous variables are held at their mean value, shifting the variable *religious* from 0 to 1 increases the probability of supporting the PKS by 34%. The anti-secular attitudes have a great impact on decision to support the PKS; one standard deviation increase in the variable *anti-secular* yields a 63% increase in the probability of supporting the PKS. People who are less satisfied with the existing practice of democracy in their country are also more likely to support the PKS; one standard deviation increase in the level of *democratic satisfaction* yields a 17% decrease in the probability of supporting the PKS. Lastly, people who spent some savings during the previous year and younger people are more likely to support the PKS compared to the rest of the population. According to these results, there is partial support for the social grievance hypothesis in Indonesia since people who have financial problems and who are less satisfied with the existing practice of democracy in Indonesia are more supportive of the PKS. Interestingly, shifting the variable *young* from 0 to 1 while holding all other variables at fixed values leads to a 75% increase in the probability of support for the PKS. The PKS seems to be much more popular among the youth in Indonesia.

The regression results for Morocco (summarized in Model 3) show that people who define themselves as religious and those who are more satisfied with the existing practice of democracy are more likely to support the PJD whereas those who have negative attitudes about autocracy are less likely to support the PJD. In other words, PJD’s constituency seems to be happy with the current semi-authoritarian system and they think that authoritarian systems are actually good. They are also more religious than the rest of the
population. A vote for PJD in Morocco reflects approval of the Monarchy rather than opposition to it. These findings provide support for hypothesis 2. The variable *religious* has the greatest impact; shifting this variable from 0 to 1 yields a 350% increase in the probability of supporting the PJD. However, it is important to note that 90% of the total respondents in Morocco define themselves as a religious person. People might be unwilling to state that they are not religious due to social norms in this country. In general, religious service attendance is a better proxy of religiosity but the variable *religious service attendance* was not included in the survey questions in Morocco, so it is excluded from the model. If I increase the variable *anti-autocracy* by one standard deviation while holding other variables fixed, the likelihood of supporting the PJD decreases by 15%. The *democratic satisfaction* has also a significant impact; one standard deviation increase in the level of democratic satisfaction yields a 55% increase in the probability of supporting the PJD.

**Conclusion**

The results summarized above confirm that the attitudes of people supporting moderate Islamic parties significantly differ across countries with different political systems. In Turkey and Indonesia, both of which are examples of partly-free secular democracies, people with higher rates of religious service attendance and those who have anti-secular attitudes are more likely to support the moderate Islamic parties. Moderate Islamic parties in Turkey and Indonesia successfully appeal to religious and anti-secular voters since the secular elite historically put pressure on religious people in these countries. Moreover, financial problems and dissatisfaction with the existing practice of democracy in Indonesia also increase the probability of supporting moderate Islamic parties whereas these variables remain insignificant in Turkey. In line with theoretical expectations, social and political grievances stimulate support for moderate Islamic parties when these parties are excluded from power like in Indonesia.

On the other hand, unlike the Turkey and Indonesia cases, supporters of the moderate PJD in Morocco believe that having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is good and they are satisfied with the existing ‘democratic governance’ in their country. Supporters of the moderate PJD in Morocco are also more religious than the rest of the population. These findings show that PJD’s pragmatic strategy to cooperate with the King is reflected in their constituency as well; a vote for PJD reflects approval of the existing Monarchy rather than opposition to him. One implication of this finding is that moderate Islamic parties may not
always be viable opposition actors that may challenge the authoritarian systems and contribute to democratic transformation in the Middle East; their potential is obviously limited due to structural constraints. When moderate Islamic parties operate in highly repressive countries where the cost of confrontation with the status quo is too high, they can be co-opted by the ruling elite. Indeed, the PJD gave priority to gaining trust of the Monarch over democratic reforms for survival concerns (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016; Drhimeur 2018). The attitudes of people who vote for PJD are in line with the pragmatic policies of the PJD; the religious supporters of PJD seem to be happy with the semi-authoritarian Monarchy.

Finally, it is important to note some of the limitations of this research. The analysis is limited to only three countries, which prevents making broader generalizations. The analysis is limited to due to limitations in data availability. Future research may include more countries in the analysis if the data becomes available. Comparing attitudes of people who support moderate Islamic parties with those who support radical Islamist parties in the future can also contribute to the literature on moderate Islamic parties.
References


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